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Introduction
This thesis was written out of the desire to gain a deeper understanding of com­
petition in imperfect markets, in particular oligopolies. Firms have many possible 
strategies at their disposal that may effect present and future payoffs, and the struc­
ture of their markets. In the first two chapters we study R&D and innovation, 
that have received an ever increasing amount o f interest, for a variety of market 
frameworks, including Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, and repeated patent races. 
Here firms compete by innovating; we study how they do it, and in which direction 
competition will evolve.
Still, many questions remain unanswered even in now classic static models of 
oligopoly, as the Cournot oligopoly, which he have used as a building block in the 
first two chapters. In chapter 3, we set out to examine the equally classical questions 
of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, and the reaction of the market to the 
entry o f new firms. Our analysis is innovative since it deals with heterogeneous 
goods and makes use of a very new set o f methods.
R&D races
There are at least two reasons for studying R&D-races: First, because they help 
understand how firms compete, and second, because now they are bong used as 
building blocks in macroeconomic models of endogenous growth. Firms have a large 
range o f strategic variables available, o f which to include all but a few quickly renders 
modelling infeasible. Most models o f innovation, like patent races or step-by-step 
R&D-races, pay attention to only one strategic variable: research effort. While some
5
important insights can be won, for example about the incentives of market leaders 
to innovate, or about persistence o f leadership in markets, this restriction certainly 
neglects other important aspects o f firms’ strategies.
Our research examines a second important strategic dimension of R&D: the 
targets. Certainly firms will decide whether they want to make small improvements 
(and maybe many of them), or go for the big innovation that will give them a lasting 
advantage over their competitors. The type of targets that firms adopt may be very 
different depending on whether a firm is a market leader or is trailing behind.
In chapter 1 we will discuss a very general framework for R&D-races which 
allows for explicit choice of research effort and innovation targets. This research is 
motivated by chapter 2, a note on step-by-step innovation races, which therefore we 
will introduce first.
In the note in chapter 2, we analyze a standard step-by-step innovation model 
(of Aghion, Harris and Vickers 1997), where firms by assumption cannot leapfrog 
each other, and where innovation targets are fixed. We show that these assumptions 
do constrain equilibrium strategies, in the sense that if we introduce the possibility 
o f leapfrogging then firms would make use o f it in most circumstances. This result 
means that even though this model is a very useful building block for macroeconomic 
models, it must be changed to allow for more complex behaviour if it is to be used 
as a microeconomic model of competition.
We show that the unique symmetric equilibrium in the step-by-step race that 
is commonly examined is unstable for certain values o f the exogenous parameters, 
and that at the same time asymmetric equilibria arise. If this happens then the 
predictive power o f these symmetric equilibria is diminished, because the market 
will have a tendency to evolve away from the symmetric equilibria and towards the 
asymmetric ones. This is particularly interesting since in the unique symmetric 
equilibrium economic growth is higher when competition in the product market 
is intense; we show that in the accompanying asymmetric equilibria, which occur 
precisely when product market competition is high, economic growth may be lower
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than in the unique equilibrium under less intense product market competition, in 
some sense reversing the previous results.
Our general model of R&D-races is set out in chapter 1. It incorporates many 
special cases, among them competition in process innovations, in products or prod­
uct qualities, and repeated patent races. We assume a basic trade-off between the 
size o f an innovation target and the ease to reach it: The more ambitious a target, 
the more difficult it is to reach it. Since research targets can have strategically 
quite different functions as defending a leading position, or gaining an advantage, 
or catching up with the competition, there is no reason why in all these situations 
firms should even have similar targets, or always the same targets as it is assumed 
in the step-by-step models. We prove that it is possible that all firms will have the 
same fixed innovation targets in equilibrium, but also show that this case is very 
exceptional. That is, in general firms have different innovation targets depending 
on the state o f competition. W e show that for industry leaders it is optimal to 
approximately move in steps, while followers adopt either one of two equilibrium 
strategies: Either they also move in steps (but of generally different size), or they 
try to make one big jump. Which of these two possibilities occurs depends on an 
intriguingly simple condition, which determines whether innovation is ’difficult’ or 
’easy’ . Lastly, we show that persistence of leadership does not depend on how fol­
lowers optimally catch up, but rather on the well-known replacement and efficiency 
effects that determine whether the incumbent has more incentives to innovate than 
the follower.
Our results therefore show that it is important to look at innovation targets as 
a decision variable to obtain a fuller understanding o f how firms compete.
Cournot Oligopoly
The Cournot model is one o f the most widely accepted oligopoly models, and is 
increasingly used to analyze markets under product differentiation. For applied work 
it is desirable to make use of as few and as weak a priori restrictions as possible, 
and our framework is general in two senses: We allow for nonlinear demand and
7
cost functions, and for heterogeneous goods.
We set out to analyze the questions of existence o f equilibria, uniqueness, and 
comparative statics with identical firms, but where products may differ from each 
other. There are relatively few general results on existence of equilibrium or com­
parative statics for heterogenous goods, and they either apply to special classes of 
demand functions (Spence 1976), or to cases where firms react to an increase in 
competitors’ output by either raising or decreasing their own output (reaction func­
tions are either increasing (Vives 1990) or decreasing (Kukushkin 1994 and Corchon 
1994, 1996)).
For our analysis we employ a new set of tools, lattice theory and monotone 
comparative statics, which allow to isolate the economic assumptions that drive the 
results, without relying on non-essential assumptions as differentiability, stability', or 
convexity. In particular, we assume that goods are substitutes (homogeneous goods 
are a special case), and identify a weak additional condition on the firms’ demand 
and cost functions that guarantees that Cournot equilibrium exists:
Condition A: Each firm reacts to an increase in competitors9 output in such a 
way that its market price does not rise.
This condition is not related to whether goods are strategic substitutes or com­
plements, therefore reaction functions may be increasing or decreasing or both. Con­
dition A  means the following: If firm i ’s competitors raise their outputs, and firm 
i does not react by changing its output, then its market price will decrease anyway 
because goods are substitutes. If firm i increases its output, market price decreases 
even further. But when firm i restricts it output, raising its price, condition A  says 
that firm i will not restrict its quantity so much that market price is higher than 
before. In particular, condition A rules out strongly increasing returns to scale in 
production, which might cause higher prices because producing less raises average 
costs, leading to a further cut in production.
We show that under condition A  and some standard regularity conditions pure 
symmetric Cournot equilibria exist. Asymmetric equilibria can be ruled out if we
8
add an additional natural assumption:
Condition B: Each firm’s price reacts stronger to changes in its own output than 
in competitors’ outputs.
This means that in its own market firm i has more control over its market price 
than other firms. It can be shown that this condition can be derived from utility 
maximization by a representative consumer. The possibility of multiple symmetric 
equilibria can only be ruled out under much stronger assumptions involving quasi­
concavity of payoffs (see Kolstad and Mathiesen 1987 for homogeneous goods).
In the second half of chapter 3, we present results on the effects of entry of 
new competitors. The inherited intuition, acquired under homogeneous goods and 
convex production cost, says that prices will decrease and total output will rise, 
while individual outputs will decrease. It has been stressed recently that prices 
may go up, and total quantity go down, if there are significant increasing returns 
to scale in production, even with homogeneous goods (Amir and Lambson 1998). 
It is also well-known that equilibrium prices and quantities move in the ’wrong’ 
direction in unstable equilibria. However, if we assume in addition to condition 
A that competitors’ outputs can be aggregated, we reinstate the typical scenario. 
Here aggregation may mean that outputs are simply added up, although we treat 
this more generally.
However, we exhibit a counter-example that shows that if aggregation o f com­
petitors’ outputs is not possible, then equilibrium prices may go up after entry even 
if there are no increasing returns to scale (we assume costless production) and the 
equilibrium is stable. This remarkable result is entirely due to the effect o f non- 
aggregation.
Total quantity and price do not necessarily move in lockstep, since market prices 
may depend on each individual quantity instead of their sum. If we evoke condi­
tion B, then total equilibrium output goes up with entry while equilibrium price 
goes down. The change in individual production quantities is characterized as with
9
homogeneous goods: they fall (rise) if goods are strategic substitutes (complements).
In the light of these results it becomes clear that in the previous literature for 
homogeneous goods quite often too many conditions were imposed at the same time. 
For example, sometimes it is assumed that goods are strategic substitutes, that prof­
its are concave in own output, and that costs are convex. O f these conditions, the 
first one yields the conclusions that equilibrium exists if goods can be aggregated 
(Kukushkin 1994), and that individual quantities decrease after entry; the second 
one yields existence of equilibrium; the third one, being sufficient for condition A to 
hold with homogeneous goods, yields existence o f symmetric equilibria (McManus 
1964), and equilibrium prices decreasing (total quantity increasing) in the number 
o f firms if goods are homogeneous. Equally, it is a strong assumption that reactions 
functions are either increasing or decreasing. If an oligppoly model with only a sub­
set o f these comparative statics properties is needed, one also only needs a subset o f 
the different conditions that have been imposed on demand and costs in the past. 
Knowing the exact consequences o f each single condition, and not imposing unnec­
essary assumptions, is very useful since it helps to alleviate the trade-off between 
very specific assumptions and the general applicability of the results of a model.

Chapter 1
Dynamic R&;D competition with 
endogenous targets
1.1 Introduction
It is now common knowledge in economics that ’competition’ in the marketplace is a 
dynamic phenomenon. Firms seek their advantage through continuous adjustments 
in prices, quality, cost, variety, and organization. These changes are often supported 
by technological progress in form o f product and process innovations. Indeed, a large 
percentage o f economic growth has been attributed to technological improvements, 
and Schumpeter’s idea of a ’process o f creative destruction’ has recently been revived, 
and has entered explicitly into endogenous growth theory, see e.g. Aghion and 
Howitt (1992), Amable (1996), Aghion and Howitt (1998).
A  plethora of models has been developed in the last two decades to analyse the 
mechanics o f dynamic competition. One strand is the literature on patent races, 
where two firms compete to make a randomly occurring innovation first, after which 
the race ends. These models focus on the optimal path o f expenditure or research 
effort, while the innovation target, winning the patent, is exogenous and fixed. Clas­
sical references are Loury (1979), Lee and W ilde (1980), Reinganum (1981), Rein-
12
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ganum (1985), and surveys are contained in Reinganum (1989), Tirole (1988, ch. 
10), and Martin (1993 ). Nevertheless, these models are not concerned with repeated 
strategic interaction between competitors, and are therefore essentially static.
A set of related models studies truly dynamic competition: Firms do not win in 
one step, but need many to do so (e.g. Harris and Vickers 1987), or competition 
may go on forever, as in Budd, Harris and Vickers (1993, BHV), and Aghion, Harris 
and Vickers (1997, AHV). In these models the different behaviors of firms that are 
close (neck-to-neck) or far apart (leader and follower) are studied, but again only in 
relation to research efforts, while firms’ innovation targets are steps of fixed size in 
a fixed order (Harris and Vickers 1987, or AHV) or the state of competition moves 
continuously (BHV). AHV show that the intensity o f competition is highest when 
firms are neck-to-neck, and that leaders compete harder than followers. BHV show 
that the state o f competition moves into the direction o f highest joint payoff, leading 
either to persistence or frequent change of leadership.
r
The research quoted above concentrates on the optimal allocation of research ef­
forts while not allowing firms to choose where they want to go, for example: leapfrog 
the leader, or catch up slowly; gain a large lead, or stay just a little ahead of the 
follower. Some recent work has focussed on the selection of innovation targets: 
Cabral (1997) considers the optimal choice of variance and covariance o f motion 
while expected progress is held constant. He gives sufficient conditions that leaders 
choose safe strategies, and followers risky ones, but also shows that the opposite 
may happen. Leapfrogging has been the focus of some recent literature on R&D 
under vertical product differentiation (Rosenkranz 1996 and, applied to intemar 
tional trade, Motta, Thisse and Cabrales 1997), where in two period-models firms 
or countries reposition themselves after an intervening shock (change in technology 
or opening o f global markets), obtaining conditions for persistence of leadership, 
or leapfrogging. These two models analyse the change from one static (interpreted 
as long-run) equilibrium to another, and are therefore not concerned with ongoing 
competition with action and counter-action, in particular not mutual leapfrogging.
13
'!<■
11
j‘î
The empirical literature on R&D has largely concentrated on the aggregated 
aspects of innovation, or on verifying various Schumpeterian hypotheses. Compar­
atively little work has been done studying general patterns of competition between 
sets o f firms, apart from case studies. One set of these, Scherer (1992, ch. 3), 
shows the various instruments o f competition: Improvements in quality (razors, 
tires, photographic film), learning curve effects (airliners), production cost (calcu­
lators), patents and standards (T V ’s and VCR’s). Some firms were able to defend 
their leadership by increasing R&D efforts, such as Gillette (razors), Eastman Ko­
dak (films), General Electric (diagnostic imaging), others ceded their markets to 
competitors, as for TV ’s, VCR’s, and fax machines. Some firms were able to persist 
but with substantially reduced market shares, as calculator and tire manufacturers, 
and Boeing (airliners).
In our research we concentrate on the optimal repeated choice of innovation tar­
gets, and its interplay with the issues raised in previous work: optimal allocation 
of research efforts, occurrence o f leapfrogging, optimal catching up by followers, 
optimal defence o f leadership, and persistence of leadership. We let firms choose 
both research efforts and targets. The fact that firms’ strategies are two- instead 
of one-dimensional significantly enriches the firms’ choice set, and leads to a more 
interesting mix o f strategies. The state of competition may be anything that differ­
entiates firms, as differences in productive efficiency, product quality, or accumulated 
knowledge towards obtaining a patent et cetera. Each firm determines where it will 
try to move this state o f competition, with a larger move less likely to achieve than 
a small one, and how much it wants to spend to do so.
Letting firms choose their innovation targets necessitates an enlargement o f the 
state space to a continuum, therefore essentially transforming the model into a dif­
ferential game with stochastic jumps. Literature on this type of games is scarce, 
with some notable exceptions such as Wemerfelt (1988), where existence o f Nash 
equilibrium is studied, or Malliaris and Brock (1982), where the resulting individual 
dynamic programming problems are discussed. In general, models o f this type can­
14
not be solved analytically. We have been able to characterize the optimal strategies 
asymptotically, and completely in some cases, and have solved the resulting games 
numerically.
Our results are as follows: In a first step, we characterize the equilibrium firm 
value, and the optimal innovation targets and efforts, using asymptotic expansions 
for large discounting. This analysis draws heavily on the techniques developed in 
Budd, Harris and Vickers (1993).
Secondly, we show that optimal innovation targets are the more ambitious the 
further a firm is ahead, i.e. no firm will try to reach a better state o f competition 
than if it were further ahead. Also, we characterize the class of ow profit functions 
that give rise to optimal innovation targets that are steps o f constant size. This 
result is of interest on its own insofar as it shows when the step-wise structure o f 
races like Harris and Vickers (1987) and AHV, which is imposed by assumption, 
may arise endogenously in equilibrium.
Thirdly, we analyse the optimal strategies o f firms that are very far ahead, or 
behind, respectively. In equilibrium, the leader will move on in a step-by-step fashion 
(e.g. "reduce unit costs by 20%M), while the follower will adopt one of two different 
equilibrium strategies: Either it tries to catch up in a step-by-step fashion, or it 
attempts to match a multiple o f the leader’s level o f progress (e.g. "reduce unit 
costs to 120% of the leader’s unit cost” ).
Which of these strategies is chosen depends on a simple asymptotic condition 
relating the probability (more precisely, hazard rate) o f making the innovation to 
ow profits: If after making an innovation ow profits increase at a rate sufficiently 
high compared to the innovation hazard rate, that is, if their elasticity with respect 
to the state o f competition is higher than the elasticity of the hazard rate with 
respect to the innovation target, then a follower will use the matching strategy.
Leapfrogging will occur when firms are sufficiently close, but whether a matching 
strategy involves leapfrogging depends on the hazard rate and ow profits (and 
value) for firms that are close. Therefore there are cases where firms that are behind
15
will always attempt to leapfrog, while in others they will first try to catch up and 
then leapfrog making smaller steps.
The fourth and last focus o f our analysis is the relation between the optimal 
innovation targets and the phenomenon of persistence o f leadership. We find that 
leadership may be persistent (or not) no matter whether followers will try to catch up 
in a step-by-step or matching fashion. Rather, persistence will depend on the well- 
known relationship between the replacement and efficiency effects, which determine 
the relative levels of research effort expended by leaders and followers.
The rest o f the paper is structured as follows: Section 1.2 states the model for- 
mally, introduces the firms’ problem, and discusses the equilibrium concept. Section 
1.3 provides a description o f equilibrium firm value and strategies under large dis­
counting. Section 1.4 contains general results on global and asymptotic properties 
of the optimal innovation targets. Section 1.5 contains some closed-form and nu­
meric equilibrium solutions. Section 1.6 concludes, and indicates some directions for 
future research.
1.2 The Model
We consider a duopoly of two firms that are competing over time. These firms differ 
in the level o f technical progress or knowledge achieved, and both firms conduct 
R&D to improve their competitiveness. Both firms have access to the same R&D 
technology.
Time is continuous, and profits are discounted at rate r > 0. At each point in 
time, both firms sell their output in the market, creating ow profits 7r (£*). We 
assume that 7T : R++ —► R+ is nonincreasing and depends only on the state of 
competition Si €  R++ (for the other firm, Sj — 1 /¿¿), which is the technology gap 
between follower and leader, where firm i is leading if < 1. Three examples of 
possible definitions o f the state o f competition and ow profits are the following:
• Productive efficiency: Si — Ci/cj (ratio o f unit production costs). W ith unit-
16
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elasticity demand (Quantity =  1 /price), for quantity' competition the result­
ing Cournot equilibrium yields ow profits of ir (5) =  1 /(1  -h <5)2, and for price 
competition Bertrand ow profits are n (S) =  ma {0 ,1 — ¿}. These are the 
two cases treated in Aghion, Harris and Vickers (1997).
• Product quality: <5, =  e p (uj — U*), where ut is firm i ’s quality level. Let there 
be a mass S of consumers with utility JJ — uk — pkj k € {¿, j } ,  each buying one 
unit per period, and where pk is the price of the good chosen. If firms have 
constant marginal costs of production c and, given product quality, compete 
in prices, ow profits are
7r (6*) =  ma {(iq  — uf) 5 ,0 } =  ma { —S log Si7 0} .
• Repeated patent race: <5, =  kj/kit where fc, is firm i ’s accumulated knowledge. 
If a firm makes an innovation that leaves it sufficiently ahead of the other 
firm, 6i <  S <  1, then it receives a patent on its technology and consequently 
monopoly profits 7Tm in the product market, otherwise profits are zero:
7T(^) =
7Tm
0
i f  Si < 6  
i f  Si > 6
Over time, both firms aim to innovate, choosing as innovation target to move the 
state o f competition to A* € (0,£j], and A j G (0,6;], respectively, and expend 
research efforts Zj > 0 to reach these targets. These are attained randomly and 
independently over time and between firms, at Poisson hazard rates determined by 
the R&D-efforts and the sizes o f the targets. By exerting a research effort z,, firm i 
in state S{ reaches the innovation target A< with Poisson hazard rate z^(A<, <$»)* Let 
D<p =  {(<5i ,<52) € K++|6i <  S2}. The function ip : D<p —* R+ is assumed to have the 
following properties: It is continuously differentiable, increasing in its first argument 
and decreasing in its second. In other words, the more ambitious the target, the 
longer is the expected time to reach it.1 We will mostly assume that ip is of the
l For a model using a similar idea see Aghion and Howitt (1992).
form ip (A ,*,6*) =  A?/<5J\ 77, fj, > 0. For [i =  77 this functional form incorporates the 
assumption that the probability o f achieving an innovation only depends on one’s 
own progress, and not on the state o f competition. Research is costly, with ow 
cost c ( ;)  at each point in time for the research effort level z >  0, where c (.) is 
an increasing, convex, and differentiable function with c (0) =  d (0) =  0. We will 
mostly assume that c (z) =  z2 3¡2.
We will characterize subgame-perfect equilibria in feedback or Markov strategies 
(A  i (• ),* ( .)) (also called Markov-perfect equilibria, see Maskin and Tirole (1997)), 
i.e. strategies that at each point in time only depend on the state o f competition, 
taking into account that at later stages play is optimal given the state of competition. 
The space o f Markov strategies is a natural choice in this model, since occurrences 
of innovations, following a memoryless Poisson process, are not history-dependent.23
Formally, a strategy for player i is a pair (A*, rt) o f functions A , : R++ —► R++ 
and zx : R++ —► R+, such that if the state of competition is 6t, then player i selects 
the innovation target A* (<5*) and exerts research effort z, (<5<). A Markov-perfect 
equilibrium is a pair of strategies (A*, zf) and (A j, Zj) that are best responses to 
each other.
Each firm i maximizes its value V* (¿<), subject to the law of motion o f the state 
of competition (j ^  i):
Vi («*) ma E [ ƒ (»  (si) ~  c fo ) )  elJt=Q ( 1.1)
s.t. dSi =  (A ; -  S() dgi +  (1/Aj -  6,) dqh (1.2)
where qt and qj follow independent Poisson processes with hazard rates Ziip(Aiy$i) 
and Zjip(Aj, 6j), respectively. Note that 1/A j is the new state for firm i if firm j  
makes an innovation. Taking expectations as in appendix 1 A .1 , or directly invoking
2 A lso, equilibria in Markov strategies are subgame perfect equilibria in the space o f  all closed- 
loop strategies.
3 Our research concentrates on characterizing equilibrium behavior o f firms if a symmetric equi­
librium exists, and we do not treat the questions o f existence or uniqueness. In fact, it may well 
be possible that multiple equilibria exist as in BHV, at least for small discounting.
18
VI
-!r 
:i;. 
:>;:';! -:
i . ;  ,
the techniques of stochastic dynamic programming with Poisson processes (see e.g. fii
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Malliaris and Brock 1982), leads to the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation i ?; j
i ' <
characterizing the value function Vi (.) o f firm i, given strategy” (A j, Zj) of firm j :  j'jf
i) -  c (r*) +  Ziip (A<, ¿¿) [V; (Ai
- z M ^ i n v m - V i W b i ) ] } .
rVi (£*) =  ma { 7T (<5 ) -  Vi (Si)]
(1.3)
u-
sjii:f
Interpreting this condition is straightforward: The value ow rVx (<5,), at the opti­
mum, is equal to ow profits 7r (<5,) minus costs o f research c (z*), plus the expected 
gains from achieving a cost-reducing innovation z^ (A < ,£ j) [V ( A i )  — V  (¿¡J], minus 
the expected losses caused by innovations that the other firm may make, Zj$ (A j,
Interior optimal strategies are characterized by the first-order conditions (assum­
ing that the value function is differentiable at the relevant points)
=  0 (1.4)
=  d {zi). . (1-5)
Condition (1.4) determines the optimal innovation size such that a marginal increase 
in expected value due to a higher target is exactly offset by the marginally lower 
probability o f reaching it. The second-order condition
&  { * ( * , * )  y ( A , ) - v - ( i , ) ] }  s oi
must also be satisfied. Condition (1.5) states that marginal effort cost should be 
equal to its marginal return, which is the expected increase in firm value after an 
innovation. Because of the convexity of c (.) the second-order condition is satisfied.
Generally, this model cannot be solved analytically, as is usual for differential 
games. Nevertheless, we have been able to identify several classes of closed-form 
solutions which will be discussed later in sections 1.4 and 1.5. In section 1.5 we will 
also exhibit some numerical solutions to the examples given above.
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1.3 Firm Value and Strategies in Equilibrium
In general, the value function V, which summarizes a firm’s possibilities in dynamic 
equilibrium for all possible values o f the state o f competition, does not have the 
same functional form as the ow profit function, or may even not be obtainable in 
closed form. Therefore a precise analytical characterization of the optimal strategies 
and competitive effects involved in equilibrium is hindered by the problem that the 
main tool o f analysis, the value function, is not known. There are two ways out of 
this problem: Either one analyses optimal innovation targets for extreme values of 
the state (<S —*■ 0 or 6 —► oo), as will be done in the following sections, or one uses 
the techniques o f asymptotic expansions introduced in Budd, Harris and Vickers 
(1993, BHV) to characterize the value function and strategies for large discounting 
(r —+ oo). Here we will state and discuss the results of this approach, assuming that 
the respective expansions exist. See appendix 1.A.2 for the computations underlying 
the following results.
We assume that the following expansions exist:4
rV(<5)
A («)
z(6)
where at least for 0 <  n <  2 the functions vn (.) are twice continuously differentiable. 
Furthermore, assume that the profit function n (.) and the innovation technology 
ij) (., 6) are twice continuously differentiable, and costs o f research effort are c (z) =  
z2/2.
Let
= £SV-"An(S) 
=  - * . ( « )
A 0 (5) =  argma xp (A , 6) [n (A ) — 7r (<5)] (1.6)
4 W e have dropped the index i  for clarity, while still indicating variables pertaining to  the other 
firm by the index j .
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be the innovation target that maximizes the expected increase in ow profits. Then 
the equilibrium value function can be expressed as
rV (6) =  7r (6) +  r~2v2 (6) +  O (r~3) , (1.7)
where
V2 (6) =  (ip (A 0, 6) [*• (Ao) -  7T (<5)])2 /2  +  zijip0j [n (l/A o>) -  ir (6)] ( 1.8)
and Z\j, tp0j — tp (A 0j, 1/ 6), and Aoj are the first terms o f the respective expansions 
of the other firm.
The optimal innovation target can be written as
A V ) =  Ao (6) -  +  O ( r '5) . (1.9)
and optimal research effort is given by
z(S) =  r “ V ( A o ,6)[7r(A 0) - 7r (6)] (1.10)
(Ao, 6) [v2 (Ao) -  V2 (6)] 4- O (r~4) .
Effort can be partitioned into two terms involved in the replacement and efficiency 
effects, respectively. Although these terms were originally coined to explain the 
incentives of monopolists to innovate, either to raise his profits, or to fend off a 
possible entrant, they readily extend to duopoly.
The replacement effect describes the "pure” incentives of the leader (the "m o­
nopolist" ) to innovate, given that by making the innovation he only replaces himself 
as the market leader, and leaving aside the threat of being overtaken by a competi­
tor. This effect therefore favours the emergence o f frequent changes in leadership if 
the leader cannot increase his ow profits, as e.g. in patent races. In our model this 
effect will be determined by the first term in (1.10),
zr =  r " V  (Ao, 6) [jt (Ao) -  7r (6)] , (1.11)
since this is the share of effort that is motivated by the expected increase in own 
ow profits.
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The efficiency effect, on the other hand, describes the incentives of the leader to 
fend off the follower: In the classical example, the value o f a nondrastic innovation 
is higher to the monopolist than to the entrant because the ensuing competition in 
a duopoly dissipates monopoly rents. Therefore, if joint value after an innovation 
of the leader is higher than after an innovation o f the follower, this effect favours 
persistence o f leadership. The part o f research effort attributable to the efficiency 
effect, apart from higher-order effects, is
~e =  r~ztp (A 0, S) [v2 (A 0) -  v2 (6)]. (1.12)
In general, both effects will be at work simultaneously, and the one that dominates 
will determine whether leader or follower expend more effort, and therefore whether 
persistence or change o f leadership will follow. Depending on the type o f ow profits, 
the replacement effect may actually work in favour of the leader, for example when 
ow profits o f the leader are not constant (as in a patent race) but increase with 
his advantage; in this case the leader may have a strong incentive to innovate even 
further.
Using the above partition of efforts, value function and strategies can be rewritten 
as
rV  (<$) =  7T (<5) -f r~2v2 (£) +  O (r“ 3) , (1.13)
v2 (5) =  - c  (rzr) +  (rzr) r/t (A 0, 5) [ir (A 0) -  7r (6)]
+  irZj )  %3 I* (1/Afltf) ~  7T (6)] (1.14)
A (£ ) — &o(6) — +  O (r~3) , (1.15)
z(6) =  zr + z e +  0  (r~4) . (1.16)
The interpretation o f these results is straightforward. If the discount rate is large, 
research efforts will be dose to zero since firms are very myopic and future profits 
count little; firm value will then mainly be determined by extending present ow 
profits into the indefinite future, V  (6) «  tt (6) /r . To second order in r, competitive 
effects stemming from effort cost, expected gains from making in innovation, and
expected losses from being preempted by the other firm, enter in the value function 
through the term t*2 (S).
The optimal innovation targets can also be partitioned into two terms: For large 
discounting the first term dominates, and the innovation target Ao is chosen as to 
maximize the expected increase in ow profits (A , 5) [7r (A ) — 7r (6)]. This value 
determines the size of the replacement effect. To second order in r, competitive 
effects enter through
A ( i ) « A o ( 6) - d  f  d2 , r
Assuming that Ao is an internal maximizer, and therefore d?zr/dA% <  0, this second 
order effect is determined by the effect o f the choice of the innovation target on the 
efficiency effect: A firm will raise or lower its innovation target as compared to Ao 
if doing so increases the joint effect o f expected gains from innovation minus effort- 
costs and expected losses from an innovation of the other firm.
As approximations, the above results will hold true not only for r —* oo, but 
by continuity also for large but finite r. Even though we do not analyze this issue 
here, as in BHV for large r very likely there is a unique and symmetric equilibrium, 
with value function, innovation targets, and research effort levels determined by the 
lowest order effects, and therefore directly by the form o f the profit function and the 
innovation technology.
Nevertheless, as in BHV, for small r, i.e. very patient firms, additional ’’self- 
enforcing” effects may enter that are not determined by the profit function or inno­
vation technology, and can even lead to multiple equilibria.5
The preceding discussion also sheds some light on the possibility of equilibria 
where the value function is ” of the same functional form” as, or an affine linear 
transformation of, the profit function. A  standard technique in dynamic program­
ming consists o f exploiting this feature by employing as candidate value function an
5 We have not yet been able to  identify such a case, which is not surprising given the difficulties 
described in BHV, p. 560.
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affine linear transformation of ow profits and determining the unknown constants 
through the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (see e.g. Stokey and Lucas 1989). 
From (1.7), in our model a necessary condition is that z>2 (¿) as defined in (1*14) 
is an affine transformation of the profit function, in particular possibly a constant. 
Below we exhibit such a case, but in general this condition is hard to meet.
1.4 Optimal Innovation Targets
In this section we will discuss several properties of the optimal innovation targets. 
We will tackle the following questions:
• Are innovation targets o f better-placed firms always more ambitious?
• When are optimal targets given by constant steps, i.e. A  (5) =  p6 with 0 < p
<  1?
• What are the innovation targets of firms that are far ahead?
• What are the innovation targets of firms that are far behind?
For the rest of this section we will assume that the innovation technology is given 
by ip (A , 6) =  A v/<p (<5), where 77 >  0 and <p is increasing in <5. For this specification 
the elasticity o f the hazard rate with respect to the innovation target A is constant 
and equal to 77. Sometimes we will assume that <p (<$) =  <5**, /1 > 0.
1.4.1 Monotonicity of Innovation Targets
First we will show that innovation targets A  (6) are nondecreasing in the state if 
the value function is decreasing. Let <5i >  <50; then Wj =  V (6 1) < t>o =  V  (<50), and 
assume that A j =  A  (61) <  Ao — A  (¿0)* Since A j and Ao are solutions o f the 
problem
ma $ j ( r ( A ) - V ( i ) )  (1.17)
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for 6 — à\ or S =  <$o, the following inequalities hold:
(v  (A <») “  Vq)  >
Ù.V /Tr / A V
t>o),
V i ) .
These can he reformulated to
¿ ^ ( A oJ -A ÏK ÎA j) > (A j-A Ï)fo ,
AJK(Ao) -  A ? F (A :)  < ( A J - A ?)«*.
Now we arrive at a contradiction to A i < Ao since t>o >  and tj >  0. Therefore 
the conclusion is that:
Rem ark 1 If the value function is strictly decreasing, innovation targets A  are 
nondecreasing.
At this level of generality, the above reasoning is not able to demonstrate that A 
may be (strictly) increasing: If A i =  Ao then the conditions describing the optimum 
do not contradict each other, rather they show that in this case A is constant in the 
range 6q < 6 < 6\.
If on the other hand we assume that problem (1.17) has exactly one solution for 
each 6, then the above weak inequalities sharpen to strict ones, and this time we 
arrive at a contradiction if A j < Ao- Also, we can weaken the requirement on the 
value function:
Rem ark 2 If the value function is nonincreasing, and if problem (1.11) has exactly 
one solution for each <5 >  0, then innovation targets A  are (strictly) increasing.
Of course, the additional condition may be difficult to check without solving the 
problem in the first place. Applications include cases where first-order conditions are 
hard or impossible to solve explicitly but the shape of the value function is known.
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1.4.2 Step-by-step Targets
In some part of the literature on R&D races, for example in AHV, firms are by as­
sumption constrained to making innovations that reduce production costs by some 
exogenously given constant percentage p G (0,1), or more generally make innova­
tions of a fixed size, which we will call step-by-step innovation targets. We will show 
later through various examples that stepping may indeed arise exactly or approx­
imately in equilibrium, but as well may be far off track. In this section we tackle 
this subject explicitly and, under some mild technical assumptions, characterize the 
value and profit functions that give rise to optimal innovation targets A  (<5) =  p6 
locally or globally.
Under step-by-step targets, the set of states o f competition that can be reached 
is very simple: If the initial state o f competition is <5o, then the states that can be 
reached are o f the form 6 =  6opn, where n G % = {..., ~2, —1,0,1 ,2 ,....} and p >  0 
is some constant. Then ’catching up’ to being neck-to-neck as in AHV occurs if and 
only if ¿o =  pm for some m G Z , otherwise firms will always leapfrog each other 
when they ’meet’ .
To begin the analysis, let for 6 G (0,3), with <5 > 0,
V (S) =  Oo +  aifi“  +  a ,«19, (1.18)
with P > a >  —17, a ja  <  0 and a2p  <  0. Assume that the optimal target is A  (£) 
~  p<5, 0 <  p <  1, and insert this expression into the first order condition o f the 
maximization problem
leading to
Ai ((a +  t?) pa -  tj) 6a + 02 ((P +»?) fP -  t?) S0 = 0.
Since this relation must hold for all 6 G (0 ,3), the terms in the brackets must be
26
identically zero, or
p =  (1 +  Q /rj)-I/o =  (1 +  P h T VB ■ (1-19)
Since these terms are strictly increasing in ct and ¡3 (with upper limit equal to 1), 
equality can only hold if a  =  /?, contradicting the assumption 0  >  a . The same 
argument holds if any countable number o f terms were included in the value function 
V, and the immediate conclusion therefore is:
Rem ark 3 If the value function on 6 € (0, <5), is of the form
+ (1.20)
where — rj < a i < ... < an <  Ot-a,- < 0, then A  (6) =  p6 for 6 6 (0,£) and for 
some p 6 (0, 1) if and only if there is exactly one i 6 N such that a* ^  0. In this 
case the step size is given by
/> = (  l+a i/r,)-1' « .  (1.21)
Note that (1.20) does not cover the case a, — 0, which corresponds to V  (6) =
— Ini, in which case the optimal innovation target is step-by-step with
A (5) =  argma | £(— In A  +  In i)
=  e” 1^  =  lim (1 +  a/rj)~^a .a—*0
Rather than an exception to the above conclusions, this case turns out to be a border 
case for which the elasticity o f the value function goes to zero, a value for which our 
result on the step size is still valid in the limit. We will discuss logarithmic value 
functions further in the examples section.
If the value function has a Taylor expansion around zero, then some straightfor­
ward conclusions follow:
Rem ark 4 Let V be defined and equal to its Taylor series on [0,5), and let the 
optimal innovation target be given by A(6) =  pS for some p €  (0 ,1) for all 6 €  [0,6).
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If the slope of \ negative at 6 =  0 then V is linear on [0,6). and
P = _ 2_1 7 + 1 ' (1.22)
If the slope of \r zerQ a£ ¿j =  q there is a unique integer m > 1 such that 
V  (5) — Qo +  and
¿ ? = ( l+ m /7 7 )-1/m. (1.23)
The first statement is proved by setting Qi =  1 and ai < 0, which is necessary 
for a negative slope at S =  0, noting that the Taylor expansion of V  around 5 =  0 
will be
V  ( 5 ) =  a o  +  f l i 5  4 * a 2& ^  +  . . . .
If the slope at 6 =  0 is zero, there will be a unique smallest integer m > 1 such that
V  (5) =  Oo +  am5m +  Qm+ii5Tn+1 4- ....,
with CLjn < 0.
In both cases, the value function will be of the form V  (5) =  a60 +  b ( l 3 > - n 1 
aft <  0). The innovation target will be
A (5 ) =  (1+ /?A ?)‘ *5, (1.24)
and inserting these expressions and A j (1/5) =  (1 4- /b in the equation de­
scribing the value function (1.3) with quadratic effort costs c(z) =  z2 f  2, the corre­
sponding "candidate’ profit functions are found to be
7T (fi) =  a 1fi2(”+<5- ,‘) +  at 6* +  Q3fii0*-’i) +  q4> (1.25)
with
ai =  “ 5 (ap/rj)2 p2v^ 20 <  0, a 2 =  ra, 
a3 =  ( a p h f p ^ 0 > ^  a4 =  rft.
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Note that 7r (6) =  a60 +  6 if either /? =  2 (p — tj), or p =  tj.
Depending on the parameters, this candidate profit function may be increasing 
over some range, which means that for this set o f parameters the innovation target 
cannot be steps o f the given size. A sufficient condition (in addition to aB < 0) for 
a negative derivative of 7r is
r? -  p  >  ma { 0, - / ? } ,
as can be easily seen from a i < 0 and Q3 > 0. Thus, the above family of profit 
functions is very special, and intimately linked to the parameters of the innovation 
technology. Moreover, it is only one-dimensional given r, 7/, and p.
To sum up, the preceding discussion shows that, if we require that the value 
function has an expansion around zero, the family of profit functions that give rise 
to step-by-step innovation targets is a one-dimensional family in the space of all 
profit functions (therefore a null-set), and is intimately related to the parameters of 
the innovation technology.
1.4.3 Leaders’ Innovation Targets
The analysis o f the last section can be applied in an approximate manner to de­
termine the evolution of the innovation targets for firms that are far ahead, i.e. 
when 6 «  0. To this end, assume that for 6 close to zero the value function can be 
represented as
V(6) =  vo +  V! 6Q +  o (6a) , (1.26)
where the last term converges faster to zero than <5°, and a  > —77 is the asymp­
totic elasticity o f the value function. This approximation may stem from a Taylor 
expansion about 0 (in that case a  is a positive integer), or may simply describe 
asymptotic behavior as e.g. in 1/  (<5 +  <52) «  6"1 for 6 dose to zero. Also, assume 
that for A  —► 0 the innovation technology may be approximated as
* (A  .« )  =  $  +  » ( * ' ) ,  (1-27)
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for some 7/ >  0, taking on in the limit the form we have used before. The maximiza­
tion problem is then
0<A<£
with first order condition
g » ,  { m + 0 (A " ))  -  » i « ° + » («“ ) ) ,
( „  +  a  +  ^ + ^ ) A “ = ( ,  +  ^ )  ( l  +  î ÿ P ) « “ .
Since for <5 —► 0 also A  —► 0 , the solution in the limit is
A / 6  —► (1 +  a/77) 1/fQ as (5 —> 0. (1.28 )
Let us summarize:
Rem ark 5 If the value /unction V and thè innovation technology ip can be ap­
proximated as in (1.26) and (1.27), then fo rò  —♦ 0 the relative innovation target 
converges to a constant depending on the elasticities of the innovation technology 
and the value function: A/6 —*■ (1 +  ot/g)^a, i.e. the leader pursues step-by-step 
innovation targets.
If the value function is o f the types described in the previous section where the 
step size p is constant, then necessarily p ~  (1 4- a /rj)-1 Q^.
We will now apply this finding to some value functions, some of which will 
appear in the examples treated below. For most of them the first order conditions 
d eterm in in g  the innovation targets cannot be solved explicitly.
• V (6) =  (1 +  ¿ )-Q =  1 — a6 -f o (6) : A/6 —*■ 77/  (7/  +  1), (0 <  a ).
• V(S) =  e p (-A *"*) =  1 -  Aí"* +  o(5) : A/6 — (1 +  a /m )_1/m, (A >  0,
771 G N).
• V  (5) =  — In (a +  6) =  -  In a — ¿6 4- o (¿) : A/6 —* 77/ (77 4-1) (a > 0). Note 
that the innovation target does not depend on a, which carries over to the 
limit case a =  0.
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1.4.4 Followers’ Innovation Targets
In this section we will characterize the innovation targets for a firm that is very far 
behind, 6 —► oo. Also, this analysis will give important insights into the occurrence 
of leapfrogging: A firm that leapfrogs when it is very far behind will leapfrog also 
when it is closer. On the other hand, a firm may try to catch up with the leader in 
a step-by-step fashion and leapfrog only when it is dose. We show in the following 
that the resulting behavior depends on the interplay between the profit function 7r 
and the innovation technology ip.
Assume that the value function V  has an asymptotic expansion of the form
V(6) =  b0 +  b ,6 -' +  o(6~ '), (76, >  0) , (1.29)
as well as the innovation technology,
y  (A , S) =  + o (A ’>) , 0? >  o ) , (1.30)
where lim *-.» o (x) jx  =  0. The following analysis is technically very similar to the 
one in the previous section, apart from one vital difference: We have to allow for the 
possibility that the innovation target A  does not rise proportionally with the state 
6, in particular that A may remain bounded from above while the state 6 goes to 
infinity. If this is the case we must use the exact functional form of V  (A ) instead 
o f approximating it asymptotically.
Let us first treat the case where A  goes to infinity with 6. Then the maximization 
problem is
gg<, ( w >+ ° (A")) M ' 7 -  w - t + °  (*-*)),0 < A < i
with approximate first order constraint
( ,  -  7 + + A - -  (n  +  4 S ? )  (>  +  = £ ? )  * - ’
In the limit 6, A  —» oo this can be written as
i)(& /sy =  1 ) - y.
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(1.31)
Contrary to the case 6 —+ 0 , this first order condition only has a well-defined solution 
in the limit if 7 <  77, with
A / « - ( l —7 h f h - (1.3 2 )
For 7 — tj in the limit it follows that A /<5 —► 0 even though A may still go to 
infinity. Finally, for 7 > 77 we arrive at an outright contradiction (to the form of the 
expansion o f V)  since the term on the left of (1.31) is positive. Therefore in this 
case A  must have a finite limit.
Let us now treat the case 7  —  77: Assume that the asymptotic expansion o f V  
can be refined to
V (6 )= b o  +  bjS~v +  W ” +  o (S~v) , (1.33)
The first order condition then becomes in the limit (using fF~v —* 0 )
rjb\Av = &2 O' — 77) $*1
which has a solution if and only if 62 <  0 with
A =  (62 (1 -  t'h ) /bi ) 1^ ,  (1.34)
i.e. A  still converges to infinity, but slower than 6. If on the other hand asymp­
totically V (6) = bQ +  biS~ v 7 then the optimal innovation may be infinite or finite, 
depending on the exact form of the value function.
Finally we treat the case o f 7  > 77 where the innovation target remains finite. 
For large 6 the maximization problem can be written as
^  (A, 5) (V (A) -  to -  d1«-7  +  o (5-1) ) ,
and knowing that A  (6) remains finite, A  (5) will be dose to
A (i) =  arg ma *  (A , 6 ) (V  (A) -  60), (1.3 5 )
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for large 6, at least if this maximizer is unique. A  (6) is bounded from above since 
ibV A '7"0 tends to zero for large A . Let
A =  lim A (<5) < oo (1.36)<5—*oo
if this limit is defined, then A  (6) —'► A  as 6 —► oo. Thus, the decision which type 
of strategy to adopt depends only on the comparison of the elasticities of the value 
function (7) and the innovation hazard (r/).
Rem ark 6 If the value function V and innovation technology rp can be approximated 
as in (1.29) and (1.30), then for 6 —*• 00 the innovation target converges as follows:
• 7 <  rj: A  —+ 00 and A fd —*■ (1 — 7¡y )1^ , ¿he follower makes step-by-step 
innovations;
• 7  =  77; A  —► 00 and A /^ * ' —► (62 (1 — u/rj) /fci)1^  (under condition (1.33));
• 7  > tj:  A  —+ A < 00, i.e. the follower matches a certain multiple of the 
opponent’s level of progress.
In other words, if the value function increases slower with an improvement in the 
state than the probability o f making the innovation decreases, then it is optimal to 
aim for step-by-step innovations. If on the other hand the value function increases 
fast, then the follower should aim for a big innovation leaving him close to the leader. 
The probabilities of reaching the targets are rather different: Step-by-step (small) 
innovations are 'easy* because the probability o f success if rather high, whereas 
matching (big) innovations are 'difficult* and have a low probability o f success.
We apply the above results to some value functions and compute the asymptotic 
innovation targets:
• V  (6) =  (1 +  S ) -a =  r °  -  o i - (o + ,)  +  o ,  ( o  >  0)
q  <  tj : A /S  — ► (1 —  a /t))l/a
a  =  rj-. A / F /(’>+1) —  1.
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a > g : A  g/ (a — 77) which is the maximizer o f A v/ (1 + A)Q. In the case o f 
’’Cournot competition” with a = 2, and 77 = 1, the result is A  — 1/  (2 -  1) = 
1, close to the numerical solution shown below.6 7
• V  (5) =  e p (—A6m), (A > 0, m € N). Since for this value function ” 7 =  oc” 
(it decays faster than any S~a with a  < 00), A  will have a finite limit equal 
to argma A^e p (—AAm), i.e. A  —* (q/A m )w.
• V  (5) =  — In (a +  6) =  — In 6 +  o (In(5), (a >  0). Since this value function de­
creases slower than any <5-Q (q >  0), a good guess given the above observations 
is that A  converges to infinity with
A /6 —> lim (1 — 7A j)1/7 =7—0
which is exactly what we have determine analytically for a =  0 in section 1.4.2.
The above results were concerned with determining the nature o f optimal inno­
vation targets when the value function is known asymptotically. In general, what 
is known is the profit function 7T, and the value function has to be determined. We 
will now use our findings from above to classify optimal innovation targets accord­
ing to the asymptotic behavior o f the respective profit functions in relation to the 
innovation technology.
Specialize the innovation technology to ip (A , <5) =  AV^*1, ^ d  assume that the 
profit function can be approximated as 7T (<5) «  p6~Q for large <5, with pa >  0. 
Therefore a  is (the modulo of) the asymptotic elasticity o f profits with respect to  
the state o f competition, while g is the constant elasticity o f the innovation hazard 
with respect to the innovation target. We obtain the following classification:
R em ark 7 Let g <  2/x and 7r (5) =  p6~a *f o (5” Q) for large 6 (pa > 0)7 Then
6 N ote that while here we specify a  form  o f the value function, in the Cournot exam ple the
resulting value function is only approxim ately o f this form , given the form o f the profit function.
7 For g >  2p we have not been able to  derive similar results. It is possible that V  has no
asym ptotic expansion in this case. A lso, the results can be  generalized easily to effort cost functions 
c(z)  =  zvfv (v  >  1), with rj < 2 p  becom ing g <  vpf  (v — 1).
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almost alwayf ford  —» oc (the firm is far behind) the value function and innovation 
target behave asymptotically as follows:
• a < t) : The value function is of the same nature as the profit function,
V (6) =  O (<5-Q), and the asymptotic innovation targets are fixed steps, A/S —* 
(1 -  a/r))v °,
• a =  rj : The value function is of the same nature as the profit function,
V (6) = O (<5-Q) , and the asymptotic innovation targets are increasing steps, 
e.g. A/<5*^ 1' —► const , while A/6 —► 0.
• 37 < Qi < 2p : The value function is of the same nature as the profit function,
V  (6) = O (6” °) t and the asymptotic innovation targets are to match a multiple 
of the opponent's progress, A  —* A .
• a > 2[i : The value function declines slower than the profit function, V  (6) =  
O (<5” 2i*), and the asymptotic innovation targets are to match a multiple of the 
opponent's progress, A  —* A .
P roof. (Outline) Substitute the asymptotic innovation targets derived above into 
equation (1.3 ) defining the value function. Use asymptotic expansions when vari­
ables go to infinity, and collect terms by magnitude. Then compare the exponents 
according to the cases above. ■
To summarize the above discussion: If profits are less elastic than the innovation 
hazard (a <  17), followers will try to catch up in a step-by-step manner, with a 
relatively high probability o f success; but if profits are more elastic (a >  77), followers 
will try to reduce their disadvantage by matching a fixed multiple of the opponent’s 
level o f progress, but the probability of success is low. 8
8 This is, apart from a null-set o f profit functions where the term  in the profit function with the 
highest exponent cancels out in (1.3), the equation defining the value function. In fact, the profit 
functions described at the end o f section 1.4.2 are o f this type.
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1.4.5 Leapfrogging and Persistence of Leadership
We will now turn to the discussion o f the two remaining points, leapfrogging and 
persistence o f leadership. It is important to remember that in this model leapfrogging 
only confers a temporary advantage which may be immediately reversed by compe­
tition, while in other models, e.g. Rosenkranz (1996) and Motta et al. (1997), this 
new state o f competition is stable. Therefore, in equilibrium the decision whether to 
leapfrog or not is subordinate to the deeper questions o f how the race will go on in 
the future, and how to catch up in the first place before leapfrogging can take place. 
The result are as following: Under the matching strategy, if the target multiple is 
less than 100% then followers will always try to  leapfrog, no matter how far they 
are behind. In all other cases, followers will first try to get close, either step-by-step 
or matching, and then leapfrog with a small step. Thus, even a firm that when far 
behind chooses the ’risky1 matching strategy, may attempt to leapfrog ’safely’ , i.e. 
to first come close with a big innovation and then leapfrog making a small one.
Persistence of leadership depends on a comparison o f the properties of the inno­
vation hazard and the value function (and ultimately the ow profits) between leader 
and follower, while the decision between step-by-step or matching targets depends 
on the properties o f the same functions for large values o f the state o f competition 8 
alone. In the former case, the replacement and efficiency effects determine which of 
the two will exert more effort, and ultimately have a higher probability o f making 
the innovation, while in the latter case it is only the prospect of higher expected 
value that counts. It is therefore not surprising that numerical simulations show 
that persistence of, or frequent changes in, leadership may each go together with 
both step-by-step or matching targets. Some examples are the following:
• Cournot competition, ?r(£) =  (1 +  £)~2, and xp(A,6) =  (A /5 )3: Step-by-step 
innovation target (A ¡8  w l/> /3 ), persistence of leadership; •
• Bertrand competition, 7r (<5) =  ma {1 — <5,0} , and ip (A , 8) =  (A/8)v for any
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7} >  0: Matching innovation target9 with leapfrogging (A  «  r\/ {v + 1)), per­
sistence o f leadership;
• Patent race, with 7r(5) =  7Tm > 0 i f < 5 < £ < l ,  and tt(6) =  0 otherwise; 
tit (A , 5) =  (A/S)v for any »7 >  0: Matching innovation target (A »  5), frequent 
changes in leadership;
• Variant o f patent race, with 7T (¿) =  1 if 6 <  1, and 7f (£) =  1/6 otherwise; 
l'1.’ (A, 6) =  (A /5 )2: Step-by-step innovation target (A/<5 es 1/2), frequent 
changes in leadership.
Summing up, we can conclude that persistence of leadership is not related to 
optimal catching-up behaviour o f followers, but rather has to do with the classical 
replacement and efficiency effects.
1.5 Examples
In this section we will exhibit two short examples o f closed-form and numerical 
solutions. As before, we will concentrate on symmetric equilibria where (A;, Zi) — 
(A j 7Zj), and assume that c(z) =  z2/2.
Exam ple 1 (Logarithm ic ow  profits): 1r (£) =  a j In (¿) +  a2 (c*i < 0), with 
candidate value function V  (S) =  a In (5) +  6, with a <  0. This is one of the few 
cases that allows for a closed-form solution, and as stated above, is a limit case of 
the family of value functions that result in innovation targets of fixed step size.
Assume that ^(A,<5) =  (A/6)v. Then the optimal innovation target is step- 
by-step, A (6) =  The expected gain from making an innovation, and thus
also the optimal effort level, is constant with =  Zi =  —afr e^, and given identical 
strategies for the other firm, the expected loss from an innovation by the other firm
9In this example, as in the next one, the elasticity o f cw profits for followers can be interpreted 
as a  =  0 0 .
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is r_ =  a/Tje. The value function fulfills the HJB equation
r (a In (8) 4- b) — n (£) — z*/2  +  -f ZjV~
=  7r(<5) +  ( - a / 7?e)2 / 2 +  ( - a / 7je) a/ije,
which, comparing parameters, can be solved for
In this case, since research efforts are equal and constant, and also the hazard rate 
of making innovations is constant, the state of competition follows a random walk, 
with leadership changing often between intermittent periods of persistent leadership. 
The expected value of the state, conditional on the initial value, is identical to this 
initial value (the same is true of any future state, though). On the other hand, the 
variance of the state conditional on the initial state becomes arbitrarily large. In 
this sense initial differences in technical progress do not matter in the long run.
Example 2: (Bertrand competition with unit-elasticity demand):
The profit function is n (5) =  ma {1 — <5,0}. Let ip (A, 8) — A /6. Since ow profits 
are constant (and equal to zero) for 8 >  1, but the value o f followers is positive and 
decreasing with 6 because of the prospect of catching up, the functional forms of the 
profit and value functions are rather different in this case, as can also be seen from 
the following numerical results (r =  0.3):
The value function remains very close to tt (6) /r  for small ¿>, but differs significantly 
for around I. Optimal innovation targets of followers are to always leapfrog the
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leader, and match about 50% of the leader’s level, i.e. achieve the double of the 
leader’s progress (since A(<5) w v/ (*ƒ + 1 )  with tj — 1), while leaders attempt to 
roughly double their knowledge with each innovation (or A  (<5) /S ~  17/  (rj 4* 1)). 
Research efforts (not shown here) take on their maximum exactly at 6 =  1 where 
firms are neck-to-neck, whereafter they fall fast for rising <5. Nevertheless, the leader’s 
research efforts are always higher than the follower’s, and therefore persistence o f 
leadership emerges.
1.6 Conclusions
In this research we have introduced an R&D race with endogenous innovation targets 
and research effort levels. We have indicated the economic effects that determine 
the optimal strategies of leaders and followers, respectively. Leaders will follow a 
(safe) step-by-step innovation strategy, while followers in equilibrium either opti­
mally adopt step-by-step innovations or choose the risky strategy of matching a 
certain level of the leader’s progress. Followers choose the latter option if the elas­
ticity of ow profits (with respect to the state o f competition) is higher than the 
elasticity of the innovation hazard (with respect to the innovation target). That is, 
if innovation is difficult then step-by-step targets are optimal, and if innovation is 
relatively easy then aiming for a big jump is best.
Under the matching strategy, the follower may always try to leapfrog; but it is 
also possible that the follower first catches up and leapfrogs when close. Persistence 
of leadership is independent of the choice of the follower’s strategy, and is solely 
determined by the replacement and efficiency effects.
Further research should tackle the following points: First, the above solutions 
are valid only under the assumption that no firm exits even if firm value is negative. 
If firms can exit the industry, which should be determined endogenously as part 
of the equilibrium solution, then this would give the industry leader an additional 
incentive to move even further ahead in order to push the competitor out o f the
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market. On the other hand, if firms can reenter (the same firm or a new one), 
then the conditions under which it enters will be relevant for the incentives of the 
leader. In particular, a market leader may not push out a little efficient competitor 
to prevent entry of more efficient newcomers.
Second, we have only treated symmetric equilibria, where two firms that are 
identical apart from the initial state o f competition apply the same strategies in 
they find themselves in comparable circumstances. We are able to show that some 
o f the value functions treated in the text may only be the result of asymmetric 
equilibria if firms have differing profit functions or innovation technologies. This 
result is in contrast with the existence of asymmetric equilibria in the Aghion e£ al 
(1997) model (see chapter 2) and Budd e£ al (1993). In particular, Budd et al show 
that for large discounting no asymmetric equilibria arise, while for small discounting 
they are possible. Therefore, an analysis of our model for small discounting may be 
of interest.
l .A  Appendix
l.A .l The Derivation of the Value Function
As noted in Aghion et al. (1997), the value function can be derived heuristically 
from e.g. (notation adapted)
V iP O - lT T - c f c ) ] *
+ e -" “  {Zii> (A*, 6,) Vi (Ai) dt +  z t f  (A,-, Sj) Vi (1 /A ,) dt 
+[1 -  (Zitfi (A ., Si) +  z t f  (A jJ J W V i (S i)},
by approximating e~rdt by 1 — rdt and dropping all terms containing dt2 or higher 
powers of dt.
Alternatively, it can be derived analytically in the following way: Let the random 
variables t\ and £2 denote the points in time where the state switches (’exits*) from
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6i to 1/A j or A*, respectively. Both t\ and £2 are independently exponentially 
tributed with hazard rates pj =  Zji/j(Aj,6j) and pi =  <5^ ), respectively. The
value (6i) o f being in state is the sum of three parts: Expected instantaneous 
profits until exit, plus expected value of exiting to any o f the other two states. Let 
r  =  min{£i, £2} be the time o f exit. The distribution function of r  is
<7(£) = Pr(r < £) = Pr(min{£i,£2} < £) 
= Pr (fj < t  or £2 < t )
— 1 — Pr (£1 > £ and £2 > £)
=  1 -  e_Plie"P3i 
=  1 _  g-fo+w)^
with density g (£) =  (pj +P2)e~^1+p7^ \ i.e. r  is exponentially distributed with hazard 
rate (pi +P 2). The present discounted value of instantaneous payoffs until exit time 
r  is
f  e~n (7r (6i) -c (z i) )d t  =  ^—  (?r (Si) -  c(zt)),
J 0 r
and its expectation over r  is
1 — e~r
£r («(St) -  c(zi))
=  ( « & ) -  c(z i))  f ~  CPi +  f t )  e - ^ - ^ d r
Jo r
r + P l+ P 2 '
If exit at r  is to state 1 /A j, then t\ =  r  < £2. Therefore the expected value of 
exiting to state 1/A j is
f *  (e_rTK (1/A ,) )  Pr (t2 > T)pie~r'rdT
=  PlVi (1 /A ,) r  e-(r+P,+Pl)rdT
PiVid/A ,) 
r + f t + f t ’
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Similarly, the expected value of exiting to state A* can be found as
PzVi (At)
r + P i  + P 2 *
The sum of all three terms is
Vi (Si) =
7T (Sj) -  c(zj) +piVj (1/A j) + p 2Vj (A t) 
r + P i + P 2
and rearranging leads to
rViiSi) =
+ P 2 ( V i ( A i ) - V i ( 6 i ) ) .
1.A.2 Asymptotic Expansions
In this appendix we will perform an analysis o f the competitive effects for large 
discounting, using asymptotic expansions as r —► oo as in Budd et al. (1993, BHV). 
Our analysis will be heuristic, for an exact exposition o f this method we refer the 
reader to the appendix o f BHV. W e assume that the following expansions exist:
v(6) =  rV (< 5 )-S r=0r -X ( « 5 ) ,
M 6 )  =  S ^ o r - “A „(5 )
z(6) = E ^ 0r-"r„ (6)
where for all 0 <  n <  2 the functions vn (.), A „ (.), Zn (.) are sufficiently often contin­
uously differentiable. Also assume that the profit function 7T (.) and the innovation 
technology rp (., 6) are twice continuously differentiable. In the following, we will 
suppress the argument 6 whenever this does not lead to ambiguities.
Step 1: Expand v (A ) =  T%L0r~nwn (<5) and t/ (A ) =  E ^ 0r " n^  (6):
Consider 0 <  m <  2. Using the expansion of A , we find that
vm (A ) — vm (A q) +  (Ao) A i
+ r -*  (Ao) A? +  *4, (Ao) A ,)  +  O ( r '3)
if the derivatives exist. Collecting terms with the same powers of r,
v (A ) =  vo (A ) +  r “ 1^  (A ) +  r“ 2t>2 (A ) +  O (r-3)
=  Wo (¿) +  r~lw1 (6) +  r~2w2 (6) +  O (r-3) ,
with
^o(£) =  ^o(Ao),
u>i (¿) =  Vq (Ao) A j 4- v\ (A o),
w 2 (¿) =  \^ o (Ao) A f -h ( A o )  A2 +  v\ (Ao) A i +  v2 (A0) .
Proceeding similarly, we obtain
v' (A ) =  tío (¿) +  r_ 1T¿i (¿) +  r "2tí2 (Ó) +  O (r~3) , 
ito (6) =  vó (A 0) ,
«i (6) =  v¡¡ (Ao) A i +  v\ (A 0) ,
«2 (5) =  |tfi'(Ao)Af +  tJÍ(Ao)Aa +  t í (A o )A i+ t /2(Ao).
Step 2: Analyze the first order necessary constraint on effort
t y ( ^ 6 ) ( v ( A ) - v ( 6 ) )  =  ¿ ( z (6 ) ) ,  
using that c {z) =  z1 ¡2 and
V- (A,6) = Co («) + r-'Ci («) + r-2Cs («) + O (r~3) ,
with coefficients £n to be determined later. In
z(S) =  X S ^ r - ^ S )
= (S^or-nCn) [rSLor-(B+1) (wn - 1>„)]
compare terms of order 0 and 1 in r to obtain
zo(S) = 0
zi (<5) = Co [«o (Ao) -  Vo (6)].
(1.37)
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Step 3: Apply (1.37) to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (HJB) defining the 
value function,
f  (6) =  n (<5) +  - 2/2  +  \zjtj (v (1 /A j) -  v (6)),
with Zjipj as the opponent’s hazard rate, and A j its innovation target. Then use 
zo(6) = 0  and various series expansion to restate the HJB as
J ^ - " « W  =  * + (3 S L ,r - " a i, ) , /2  
+  ( £ £ . . - % , )  ^ S r =0r - (n+1> K  (1/A j )  -  r„ («)).
Comparing terms of order 0 and 1 in leads to
V0 (5) = 7 t(5),
Step 4: Simplify v (A ) and t / (A), using the expressions just derived:
U>o(£) =  7T(Ao)
Wl(S) =  rf (Ao) A i
W2 (¿) =  (Ao) A f +  V  (Ao) A 2 4  V2 (A o),
and
no (6) =  7/ (Ao)
M * )  =  ^ ( A o ) A i
«2 (6) = J«*(A 0)A f4 ^ (A o )A 14i4(A o).
Step 5: Now we will apply the results obtained so far to the first order constraint 
defining the optimal innovation targets,
iff [v (A ) — v (5)] 4  in/ (A ) =  0, (1.38)
where we used the shorthand \ff — dip/dA (rp" — cPip/dA2). Expanding \p (A , <5) 
and %f/ (A , 6) about r“ 1 =  0, we obtain (suppressing the argument 6 in ip and tpf for
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conciseness)
iK A ) =  C o W + ^ 'C .  (<5) +  t - - 2C 2 (6) +  o  (r--3)
=  ^ (A o) +  r “ V (A o ) A ,
+ r - 2 W  (Ao) A? +  i f  (A 0) A 2) +  O (r -1) ,
and
V ( A )  =  i o ( « ) + r " 1« i ( « ) + ' ' - 2i 2 ( i )  +  0 ( r - a)
=  (Ao) +  r“  V " (Ao) A,
+ r " 2 (5^  (Ao) Aj + iff (Ao) A2) +  O (r 3) •
Substituting the expansions into (1.38),
(E ^ o r -”Çn) [L ^ o r -  (wn - 1,„)] +  =  0,
and collecting the terms of order 0 in r~1 leads to
£o (wo “  ^o) +  Co^ o =  0
$  (Ao) [** (Ao) -  * (<$)] + ifj (A0) it (A0) =  0,
or, assuming that the second order constraint is satisfied,
A 0 ($) =  arg ma xl> (A, 5) [7r (A ) -  tt (6)]. 
Collecting terms o f order 1 in r“ 1,
Îo (tüi — vi) +  Î j  (two — Uo) +  Co^i +  Ci^o =  0, 
ÿ  (Ao) i f  (Ao) A! + 2i f  (A0) it (Ao) A ï 
+V,// (Ao) [tt (Ao) — 7T (6)J Ai = 0,
A i ^j t  $  ( A ,  £ ) {n ( A )  -  7T (tf)]) |A=Ao =  0i
and assuming that generically the second order sufficient condition holds (d? (.) / 5A 2 
< 0), leads to
A i (6) =  0.
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Step 6: Simplify v (A ), t1' (A ), ib (A ), and ip (A ) using A i — 0:
w Q -  tv (A 0) , w i  =  0, w 2 =  (A 0) A 2 4 1'2 (A o) ,
uo s= 7r' (A o) , ui =  0, u2 =  7r" (A o) A 2 4- v'2 (A o),
Co = ^ ( A 0) , Ci =°> C2 =='0, (A o) A 2,
C0 = $  (Ao), Ci = 0, C2 = V'" (Ao) A2.
Step 7: Find z2 (6): Simplify the result for zu and compare terms of order 2 in r-1 
in
z(6) =  S * i r - s . ( i )
=  ( £ S « r - " f „ )  [Sr=0r - (n+l) («*. -  #w)],
to obtain
zo (6) =  0, zi (6) =  ip (A 0) [tt (A o) -  tt (<5)]
*2 (<$) = Co (W1 (£) “  l'i W) + Ci (t»o W  ~  vo (¿))
= 0.
Step 8: Using the last result, identify the terms o f order 2 in r “ 1 in the HJB equation 
Sr=o»""vn =  7r +  (S ~  ir- ” - ) 2 /2  +  ( £ £ . !» - % ,)  x  
(E”=0r -nTpni) (S ” 0r - (n+1) [t>„ (1 /A j) -  vn ( i ) ] ) ,
to obtain
v2 =  z\/2 -f ZijVoj [i>0 (1 /A j)  -  I'D (<5)’
= (* (Ao) [tt ( A o) -  7r (5)])2 /2 + z ^ aj [* (l/A 0J) -  tt («)],
where Z\j, xp0j, A qj are the first terms o f the respective expansions of the other firm. 
Step 9: Find A 2, the next term in the expansion o f the optimal effort level by 
collection all terms of order 2 in r “ 1 in (1.38):
Co (™2 “  2^) + Ci («>1 -  Vi) 4  C2 -  no) 4  Cou2 4  Ci«i 4  C2«o = 0,
■o ipf (Ao) [7r7 (Ao) A 2 4  u2 (Ao) — V2 (5)] 4  (Ao) A 2 [7T (Ao) — tt (<5)]
+*P (Ao) [tt* (Ao) A2 4  *4 (Ao)] 4  ip* (Ao) A ^  (Ao) = 0,
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which can be simplified to
2V ; ô%>(A)tir(a)-*(i)])/ôA2lA*Ao-
Step 10: Apply previous results to (1.37) and collect terms of order 3 in r“ 1 to find 
the next term in the expansion of z (6):
w0 = Jr(Ao), «ÜJ =0, ^ ^ / ( A o î A î  +  tiîiAo),
tio = rf (Ao), «i =  0, «2 = Jr* (A0) A2 + t/2 (A0) ,
Co = V(Ao), Ci = 0, C* = ^(A o)A ,,
Co = (Ao), Ci =  0, (Ao) A2.
23 (5) = Co [«"J ~ "îl + Cl K  -  Vi] + C2 K  -  I'd]
= V’ (Ao) [tt7 (Ao) A2 + 1>2 (A0) -  i>2 (i)] + i !  (Ao) A2 [tt (A0) -  7r (6)]
= A2&  (A) [w (A) -  7T (5)]) |*=Ao +  V» (A») h  (A») -  «2 (5)]
= ii> (A0,6) [i’2 (A0) -  V2 (5)],
since the derivative is zero.
As in BHV these expansions could be continued to find higher-order effects, but 
these will be hard to interpret since they will be a mixture o f the other effects 
and involve, higher-order derivatives o f the underlying ow profits and innovation 
technology.
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Chapter 2
A  Note on Step-by-step races
2.1 Introduction
In this note we will examine a relatively new model o f technical progress that has 
been used as a building block in the ’Schumpeterian* or endogenous growth lit­
erature, e.g. in Aghion, Harris and Vickers (AHV, 1997). It models non-drastic 
innovation by strongly restricting the dynamics o f competition: Innovations occur 
’step-by-step’ , which means that a firm that has fallen behind must first catch up 
and equalize with the leading firm before moving ahead. In particular, ’leapfrog­
ging’ is ruled out by assumption. AH V analyze this model to give an example of a 
model o f dynamic innovation competition where contrary to the results on drastic 
innovations ” more intense product market competition and/or imitations may be 
growth-enhancing” . They do this by comparing Bertrand and Cournot competition 
in the product market.
Our note elaborates on this example concerning two points: First, the authors 
only analyzed symmetric equilibria, showing that there is a unique one. This anal­
ysis does not reveal whether there are asymmetric equilibria as well, and whether 
the symmetric one is stable. In fact, these two points are connected, since in the 
presence of asymmetric equilibria the symmetric one is mostly unstable. Stability o f
48
equilibrium is a desirable property for predictions or empirical applications, since the 
market will move away fast from unstable equilibria if there is the slightest amount 
o f noise. We show that a pair of asymmetric equilibria may arise under Bertrand 
competition in the output market, leaving the symmetric equilibrium unstable, and 
that economic growth is lower in these asymmetric equilibria.
Second, we will discuss the assumption that firms cannot leapfrog the leaders and 
delineate the circumstances where firms would leapfrog in equilibrium when they 
have the choice to do so. Leapfrogging in equilibrium would occur under Bertrand 
competition, but may not occur under Cournot competition. Our analysis provides 
hints that traditional Schumpeterian leapfrogging models o f drastic innovation are 
more appropriate if market competition is high, while the step-by-step assumption 
is justified when competition is less intense.
2.2 The Model
We will first describe the setup of the AHV model. Two duopolists with constant 
marginal cost compete in a market for a homogeneous product either in quantities or 
prices (Cournot or Bertrand competition, respectively). Market demand has unit- 
elasticity, i.e. it is o f the form p =  1 /Q , where Q is total output. Therefore if firms' 
marginal costs are q  and c; , ow profits o f firm i under Cournot competition are 7r* =  
1/  (1 +  Cj/Cj)2, while with Bertrand competition they are 7r* =  ma {1 — c,/c,-,0 }.
Both firms conduct research to make cost-reducing innovations. These innovar 
tions reduce unit costs by a fixed factor 7 >  1, i.e. cj =  Ci/7, and arrive randomly 
and independently in continuous time with Poisson hazard rates determined by the 
research efforts o f the two firms. A  fundamental assumption of this model is that 
any firm can be maximally  one step ahead: After a firm moves ahead it has to wait 
until the other one has caught up. This assumption can be justified by assuming 
that any further innovation would immediately disclose the last innovation to the 
other firm, so that in practice a new innovation does not change the cost gap. The
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possible states of competition are therefore S =  { —1,0 ,1 }, meaning that either firm 
i is behind, or firms are neck-to-neck, or firm i is in front.
Let firm z’s research efforts be (x ,y) € R 2 , and firm f s  (x,y) 6 R2 . When 
firms are neck-to-neck their research efforts are x  and x, and when they fall behind 
the efforts are y and y. Research is costly, with cost 0 (2) =  r2/ 2. Catching up 
is easier than moving ahead: The hazard rate o f a firm that has fallen behind is 
y 4- ft, where h >  0 measures the ease o f imitation. Market profit ows are given 
by 7T], 7To, and 7r_i, for a firm that is leading, neck-to-neck, or behind, respectively; 
r > 0 is the common discount factor. As in AHV, we will only be concerned with 
pure strategy equilibria in perfect Markov strategies, i.e. pine strategies that form 
a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium o f the dynamic game, and only depend on the 
state in { —1, 0, 1} o f the game.
Expected equilibrium payoffs are then characterized by the value functions 
rVi =  f f i - t e  +  Z O M -V o ) ,
rV0 =  7T0 - c ( x ) - f  x(V1- V 0) - x ( V 0 - V „ i) t (2.1)
rVLi ~  7T-i — c (y) +  (y +  h) (Vo — VLi),
where Vi, V0t and V_i are the values of being ahead, neck-to-neck, and behind, 
respectively. For example, rVo, the discounted value o f being neck-to-neck, is deter­
mined as ow profits 7r<> minus costs o f research c (x), plus the expected gain from 
innovating x  (Vi — Vb), minus the expected loss caused by an innovation of the other 
firm, x (Vo — V lj). Given the strategy pair (x ,y ) of the other firm, the optimal 
strategies x  and y o f a firm that is neck-to-neck or behind, respectively, have to 
satisfy the necessary first order conditions
¿ {x )  =  (V, -  Vo) (2.2)
c '(y ) =  (V o -v - - , ) .
Taking pair-wise differences between the value functions (2.1) and inserting the first 
order conditions (2.2) we obtain the following system of equations characterizing the
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best responses (x ,y ) € 6 (x, y) (only the non-negative solutions are relevant), where 
b : —» R^ _ is the best response correspondence (also, p\ =  TC\ — TTo, po =  no — tt- i ,
and s =  h +  r):
±x2 +  (y +  s ) x - x y  «  pi, 
\y2 - \ x 2 +  (x +  s)y  =  pq.
(2.3)
Corresponding equations characterize 5  and y. Note that we explicitly allow asym­
metric choices for all effort levels. For symmetric strategy pairs, x = x  and y =  y, 
(2.3) are solved by AHV to yield the equilibrium strategies
X = <s/s2 + 2pi — 3, 
y =  y/s2 +  x 2 +  2 (pi +po) -  y/s2 4- 2pi.
They also show that the growth rate of the economy if there are many identical
sectors is given by
9 =  2x
y +  h
y 4* h +  2x
In 7.
It can be shown that in asymmetric equilibria the average growth rate is given by
(Xi +  Xj) (Sft +  h) (y, +  h)
9 ”  ------- :--------n ------- :------- :---------- 1117.
( V i  + h 4* x j ) ( y j  +  h +  X*) -  x ^
2.3 Asymmetric Equilibria
In theory, (2.3) could be solved explicitly for (x, y) and (x , y ), since it can be shown 
that these four equations can be ’reduced1 to four independent polynomial equations 
of order four, which still have analytical solutions. Instead, we will use the inverse 
response map (x, y) ~  6“ 1 (x, y), similar to Harris and Vickers (1987).
2.3.1 The Inverse Best Response
We will move in two steps, first, as we show in appendix 2.A.1, note that the 
strategies that are used in some equilibrium are exactly the solutions to the fixed
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point equation (x, y) E b(b(x,y)),  while strategies in symmetric equilibria make up 
the subset for which also (x, y) E b (x, y) holds. Second, if b~l is the inverse o f 
the best response, (x,y) €  b(b(x,y)) if and only if (x, y) E b~l (b1 (x ,y )), as shown 
in appendix 2.A.2. Therefore we can work with the inverse reaction map which in 
this case is more straightforward, and have the following: (x, y) E is a strategy 
played in some pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium (symmetric or asymmetric) 
if and only if (x,y) E (f>-1)2 (x,y). It is part o f some symmetric equilibrium if and 
only if (x,y) E b_1 (x,y) C (b~l)2 (x ,y).
Best responses (x, y) =  b (x, y) in pure Markov strategies for the R&D-race are 
given by the equations (2.3). Under the natural assumptions that ttj >  7r0 (profits o f 
a leader are strictly higher than those of a firm that is neck-to-neck), and 7T0 > 7r_j, 
for any best response (x, y) € R+ to (*» V) € M+ we must have x > 0 and y >  0, i.e. 
(x,y) E R++. The inverse response map 6 '1 : R^ _+ —► R2 is then given by solving 
(2.3) for x  and y}
x =  ( p o  + x2/2 -  y2/2) /y -  a, (2.4)
9 =  (pi +  Po -  2/V2 -  Vs) ! x  ~ s •
Note that for large x or y the images x  or y may be negative. This simply means 
that this (x, y) is not a best response to any feasible (i.e. non-negative) strategy o f 
the other firm. Therefore, (x,y) is a best response to some feasible strategy by the 
other firm if and only if 6” 1 (x,y) >  0.
2.3.2 The Graphical Solution
The fixed point condition on pure Markov perfect equilibrium strategies, (x, y) 6 
(6-1)2 (x, y), is still difficult to visualize, since (6"1)2 is a map with a four-dimensional 
graph. The same is true for the fixed point condition on symmetric equilibria, 
(x, y) E b~l (x ,y ). They can be ’solved* numerically, but this is little intuitive, 
and also there is no guarantee that all solutions are found. We therefore propose
a graphical solution where the fixed points can be visualized in two-dimensional 
space. Let F  be either one o f the maps (fr-1) or h , and let F =  (FT, Fv), where 
Fx, Fy : R* -* R+. That is, if F  (x, y) =  (x, y), then Fx (x, y) =  x, and Fy (x, y) -  y. 
The fixed point condition (x, y) — F  (x, y) can then be expressed equivalently by 
the two conditions x — Fx (x, y) and y =  Fv (x, y). These describe two curves in R +, 
and equilibrium strategies can be found at their intersections. Denote by Alx and 
A* the curves pertaining to F  =  b~l (for symmetric equilibria), and by Ax and A* 
the curves pertaining to F =  (fc-1)2 (all equilibria).
Let us consider the cases o f Cournot and Bertrand competition. Under Cournot
* 2competition and unit-elasticity demand the profit function is 7T* =  1/(1 +  
with s =  0.02 and 7 =  2 we obtain the following figure:
Figure 1: Equilibria under Cournot competition (s =  0.02, 7 = 2).
We can see that A £  and meet at the same point as A \  and j4*, since A \ .  and 
describe the symmetric equilibria. Since A\ and A*, and also j4£ and j4J, do 
not meet anywhere else, there is exactly one equilibrium, and it is symmetric (at 
x «  0.604 and y  «  0.392, with average growth rate g «  0.209). This is the generic 
result under Cournot competition as we will argue below.
However, under Bertrand competition (71* =  ma (0 ,1 — 7"*}), also with s =  0.02 
and 7 =  2, we obtain Figure 2:
MFigure 2: Equilibria under Bertrand competition (5 =  0.02, 7 =  2).
Here there is a pair of asymmetric equilibria (involving the strategy pairs (x i, t/j) 
w (1.229,0.734) and «  (0.643,0.156), and growth rate g «  0.140) and one
symmetric equilibrium, with (x ,y ) ft* (0.980,0.400) and growth rate g ft! 0.235. We 
can see that the existence o f asymmetric equilibria depends on the relative slopes 
of the loci and A j around the symmetric equilibrium: The example in Figure 3 
(s =  0.15, 7 =  2) shows that asymmetric equilibria exist if and only if the slope o f 
Aj is steeper than the slope of AJ (in coordinates (x,y)):
Figure 3: Equilibria under Bertrand competition (s =  0.15, 7 =  2).
Simulations show that these relative slopes vary monotonically with s and 7 : 
Decreasing "discount rate -f* ease o f imitation" s and increasing innovation size 
7 makes A^ steeper relative to A* around the symmetric equilibrium, i.e. make
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asymmetric equilibria more likely. Therefore, under Cournot competition there are 
no asymmetric equilibria since it can be shown that in the extreme case s —» 0 and 
7 —► oo no asymmetric equilibria exist. For Bertrand competition, given s (7) there 
is 70 ($0) such that there are no asymmetric equilibria for 7 < 70 (s >  so).
2.3.3 Welfare Properties of Asymmetric Equilibria
The existence o f asymmetric equilibria under Bertrand competition has a straight­
forward interpretation: More relative advantage for the leader, either because the 
product market is more competitive (Bertrand instead o f Cournot competition), or 
because cost reduction through innovations are bigger (7 higher), or because im­
itation is more difficult (lower /i), or because players are patient and care about 
long-term advantage (lower r ), may result in endogenous asymmetry'. Ex ante iden­
tical firms choose different strategies because ’the market is too small’ , and one o f 
them emerges as a ’natural leader’ , whereas the other becomes a ’natural follower*. 
Beliefs about each others’ strategies then reinforce the asymmetry even though there 
are times when both firms are neck-to-neck and have the same cost of production, 
because they follow different investment strategies.
As argued above, considering the symmetric equilibrium as the ” legitimate so­
lution” or even prediction o f the game is questionable if it is unstable. Using the 
best-response maps, we can show in our examples that in the presence of a pair of 
asymmetric equilibria the symmetric equilibrium is unstable in the sense of Seade 
(1980), i.e. not all eigenvalues of the matrix M  =  I2 +  B  are non-positive, where 
I2 is the 2 x 2  unity matrix, and B is the matrix o f derivatives o f the best-response 
function.1 Here the most reasonable prediction would be that the market ends up in 
one of the asymmetric equilibria, even if this is subject to the equilibrium selection 
problem.
The comparison o f payofls and growth rates between symmetric and asymmet-
l This is essentially an index-theoretic result, as was applied to  Cournot oligopoly by Kolstand 
and Mathiesen (1987).
ric equilibria is also o f interest: It turns out that the (neck-to-neck) pavofis for 
the Bertrand example in Figure 2 are 28.39 and 1.525, whereas in the symmetric 
equilibrium they are 8.813 for each firm. Therefore, in the asymmetric equilibrium 
the ’follower’ is much worse off, but joint payoffs are higher than in the symmetric 
equilibrium. We were not able to prove this analytically, but suspect that this may 
hold generally: Since for the disadvantaged firm it is rational to hold back its efforts, 
there will be less dissipation of monopoly rents than in a symmetric duopoly.
On the other hand, as noted above, average growth rates are higher in symmetric 
equilibria. This can be explained by the same factor: Even though the ’leader’ 
credibly exerts very high research efforts, since the disadvantaged firm invests less 
in research, catching up or overtaking will occur less often, which lowers the long-run 
growth rate.
This divergence between joint payoffs and growth, together with the instability 
o f the symmetric equilibrium, may make asymmetry a welfare issue: Too much 
advantage for the leader (even if the competitors are ex ante on equal footing) may 
slow down growth while keeping industry profits at a higher level. Therefore, higher 
competition in the product market will only certainly raise growth if the equilibrium 
will not give rise to asymmetric equilibria.
2.4 To leapfrog or not to leapfrog
AHV assume that cost-reducing innovations are o f a fixed size 7, and that a firm 
that has fallen behind first has to catch up with the leader (make an innovation of 
size 7) instead o f leapfrogging him (making an innovation o f size 72). In this section 
we will discuss the equilibrium outcomes if leapfrogging is possible.
We will analyze whether in the present model ’no leapfrogging’ is an optimal 
choice if leapfrogging to the leader’s position is possible. In this case the assumption 
o f ’no leapfrogging’ imposes no restriction on the equilibrium strategies.
We will assume that ’no leapfrogging’ is an equilibrium, with value functions as
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in (2.1) given by
rtf' =
tV — 7T0 -  c (xj) +  Xi (Hr - V ) -  Xj (V -  u ) , 
rU =  7r_i -  c (pi) +  (yj +  h) (V" -  U) ,
and first order conditions for optimal effort levels given as in (2.2) by
d (Xi) =  (W -  ? ) ,
¿ f a )  = < y - o ) .
A follower who is deliberating to leap-frog faces the following value of leapfrogging 
(assuming that afterwards the equilibrium without leapfrogging is played):
rUi =  7r_i -  c(z) 4- (z +  h() (W -  Ui) ,
where we assume that imitation is more difficult than for just catching up: 0 <  hi < 
h. Research effort is z >  0, and at the optimum is characterized by the usual first 
order condition d (z) — (IV -  C/j). Using this first order conditions and solving2 for 
Ui leads to (assuming quadratic cost of research as above)
0  =  ){* -\  +  \y1 +  hy),
Ui =  W - y / { h i + r ) 2 +  2 (rlV -  ir_i) +  (h, +  r ) .
The follower prefers catching up over leapfrogging if U >  Ui. After some manipula­
tions using the first order conditions, and because in equilibrium W  =  x  +  y  +  Vy 
this condition can be written as
x2 +  2xp +  2xhf -f 2yhi < 2ph.
This can only hold if, in equilibrium, effort levels are very small and hi is small 
enough. A  necessary condition for preferring catching up over leapfrogging is x2 +
2 The second root of the equation for Ui is occluded by W — Ui >0.
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2xy < 2yh, which is indej>endent of the value of h\. It can be shown that this condi­
tion is more likely to be satisfied if innovation size 7 is small or discount rate/ease of 
imitation s is large (and therefore x  and y are small), and an example for Cournot 
competition where catching up is preferred to leapfrogging is the equilibrium under 
the parameters 7 =  1.1, h =  0.2, and r =  0.01. On the other hand, under Bertrand 
competition this condition never holds for any 7 >  1, and therefore firms prefer 
leapfrogging even if imitation is difficult, h\ — 0, and therefore the ’equilibrium’ 
with catching up is never an equilibrium under Bertrand competition if we allow 
firms to leapfrog.
To sum up, if we relax the assumption that firms cannot leap-frog, then no 
leapfrogging arises as an equilibrium outcome only when the intensity o f competition 
in the product market is small (Cournot competition), or innovation size is small, 
or the discount rate and ease o f imitation are large. That is, if the advantages of 
being a leader are high then leapfrogging is more attractive.
2.5 Conclusion
For a simple model of step-by-step innovation competition we have shown that the 
unique symmetric equilibrium may be unstable if product market competition is 
high, innovations large, and discount rate and ease o f innovation small. In this case 
asymmetric equilibria exist as well, possibly altering the empirical predictions and 
welfare properties o f this model.
We have also shown that the assumption that firms cannot leapfrog each other 
does restrict equilibrium strategies in the sense that firms would prefer to directly 
leapfrog each other unless market competition is low, innovations are small, and 
discount rate and ease of innovation are large.
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2.A  Appendix
2.A.1 Symmetric and Asymmetric Equilibria
In a game with 2 players, strategy spaces Si (¿ =  1,2) and given pure strategy best 
response maps bt : Sj —► 5, (j ^  ¿), the pure strategy equilibria s =  (sj, s2) 6 Si x S2 
are characterized by the fixed point equations Si € bi (sj) (j i). This leads to the 
necessary condition on an equilibrium strategy s,
Si €  bi (bj {Si)) (j ±  i), (2.5)
which does not depend on the strategy o f firm j . For identical best response maps bj 
=  b2 = b on Si =  $2l this condition becomes s,- € b(b (s*)) — fe2 (s*) (i =  1,2). Any 
Si with 5, € b2 (s^ is part of some pure strategy Nash equilibrium (s^ Sj) since there 
is Sj € b(si) with Si € b (s^), but not all combinations of ($i, s2) with Si €  b2 (st) 
(i =  1, 2) is a Nash equilibrium.
Also, Si with Si 6 b(si) are part o f symmetric pure strategy equilibria (®i, «2) 
with Si =  s2. It is obvious that
{ S j  €  $ 1 *  €  b ( S i ) }  C  { S i  €  Si\st 6  i > 2  ( « * ) }  ,
i.e. symmetric equilibria are trivial ’asymmetric* equilibria. Strategies appearing as 
part of (non-trivial) asymmetric pure strategy equilibria are therefore given by
{ i i  €  $ 1 *  €  b2 A St i  & («,)} •
These conditions are illustrated in the context of the following static game: There 
are two players with strategy sets S\ — S2 — [0 ,1], and payoffs are s{ (sj — 1 )2 — s2/2 
(i — 1,2; i 7^  j). Best responses are found to be single-valued with b (sj) =  (sj — l ) 2, 
and the pure strategies in equilibrium are given as the solutions (over [0 ,1]) of the 
following equations
symmetric : Sf =  (s^  — l ) 2 =» s* =  § — |v/5,
(a)symmetric : st =  ((s* — l )2 — l )2 =* s* € |o, | — |\/5, 1J .
The pure strategy Nash equilibria are therefore (0 ,1 ), (1,0), and (| —1\/5, | — j\ /5 ).
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2.A.2 The inverse best-response map
Above we argued that to find the set o f all pure equilibrium strategies we can work 
with the inverse response map instead o f the response map itself. To this end we 
prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1 The sets of fixed points of b2 : R .^ —► R2 and of (b~1)2 : R2 + —► R2 are 
identical:
{(xi v )  I ( x , y )  e (*,y)} = {(x,y) I ( x , y )  € (6-1)2 (i,y)}.
P roof. Extend 6_1 to the whole o f R2 by defining b~l (x, y) =  0 if (x, y) G R2\R++, 
and define 6"1 (0) =  0. Let (x ,y) be such that (x,y) G fr2 (x ,y ); then there is 
(x ,2/) € R 2 + such that (x ,y) G b (x,y), (x ,y ) G 6(x, y), and therefore (x ,y ) G R 2 +- 
Then it is obvious that (x ,y ) G 6**1 (x ,y ) and (x ,y ) G 6“ 1 (x ,y ), therefore (x ,y ) G 
( ir 1)2 (x, y).
For the converse, let (x ,y ) G (6“ 1)2 (x ,y ). Then there is (x ,y ) G 
R++ such that (x ,y ) G i r 1 (x ,y ), otherwise (6“ 1)2 (x,y)  would be empty. Therefore 
(x,y) e b (x , y )  and (x ,y ) G 6 (x ,y ), i.e. (x ,y ) G 62 (x ,y ). ■
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Part II
Cournot Oligopoly
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Chapter 3
Existence and Comparative Statics 
in Heterogeneous Cournot 
Oligopolies
3.1 Introduction
Since Cournot’s early contribution his model of oligopoly has received more and more 
attention, and nowadays is a basic building block o f applied work on a wide range 
of topics involving imperfect competition. Its usefulness depends on two features: 
First, existence and uniqueness o f equilibria at the market stage must be easily 
established, and second, comparative statics results should be readily available. In 
the context o f homogeneous goods both these aspects have been treated extensively, 
whereas for heterogeneous goods there are much fewer results available.
It is possible to  ascertain the existence o f pure Cournot equilibria under the as­
sumption that profits are concave, using the general result that games with concave 
payofls possess pure equilibria (see Friedman 1991). This condition is not easily 
translatable into assumptions about demand and production costs, therefore there 
have been many attempts to identify those features that guarantee the existence
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o f equilibria. The first strand o f the literature identified conditions on demand 
that could be fruitfully exploited: Novshek (1985), Kukushkin (1994) and Corchon 
(1994,1996) assume that goods are strategic substitutes, while Vives (1990) assumes 
that goods are strategic complements. Therefore it is assumed that firms’ reaction 
functions are either decreasing or increasing. The second strand initially imposed 
assumptions only on costs and proved the existence o f symmetric equilibria: Mc­
Manus (1962, 1964), and Roberts and Sonnenschem (1976) assumed that costs were 
linear or convex, i.e. had nonincreasing returns to scale. Amir and Lambson (1998) 
showed for homogeneous goods that it was possible to allow for limited increasing 
returns to scale in production, resulting in a condition that combines both the de­
mand and cost functions. It is interesting to note that it is not by chance that these 
two strands o f the literature exist, since fundamentally each strand uses one of the 
two stability conditions by Hahn (1962), which impose different kinds of regularity 
on the model.
Most o f the above authors have only covered the case o f homogeneous goods. 
Kukushkin (1994) and Corchdn (1994, 1996) deal with additive aggregation, i.e. 
where the sum of competitors’ outputs is relevant, but assume strategic substitutes; 
Vives (1990) allows for general non-homogeneous goods, but under strategic com­
plements. Spence (1976) indicates how to prove existence o f Nash equilibria for a 
special class of inverse demand functions with heterogeneous goods. Our work is the 
first to address the question of existence of equilibria with heterogenous goods in a 
general context that does make not use of the assumption o f strategic substitutes 
or complements. Rather, it is based on the second strand o f literature and directly 
generalizes Amir and Lambson’s (1998) work to heterogeneous goods.
We impose the condition that firms react to a rise in competitors' quantities by 
adjusting their own production in such a way that their market price does not rise 
(condition A ). Doing so, output may increase or decrease, but must not decrease 
too strongly. This condition is formulated without making use of differentiability 
or convexity assumptions, rather it is formulated in lattice-theoretic terms as a
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single-crossing condition. If goods are substitutes, and under standard regularity 
conditions, we show that this condition implies the existence of symmetric pure 
Cournot equilibria even when outputs are heterogeneous.
Concerning uniqueness, asymmetric equilibria can be ruled out if we add the 
additional weak assumption that own market price reacts more to changes in own 
output than in competitors’ outputs (condition B ). Multiple symmetric equilibria 
can be excluded only under much stronger assumptions.
Comparative statics on demand or cost variables for Cournot oligopoly have been 
analyzed by many authors, among them Frank (1965), Dixit (1986), Corchón (1994, 
1996), while comparative statics with respect to the number of firms have been 
discussed by Frank (1965), Ruffin (1971), Seade (1980 ), Szidarovsky and Yakowitz 
(1982), Corchón (1994, 1996), and recently by Amir and Lambson (1998). The 
case of heterogeneous goods has been treated by Dixit (1986) for two firms, and 
by Corchón (1994, 1996) for additive aggregation, but they as most authors have 
imposed the assumption of strategic substitutes from the outset, which is irrelevant 
for most comparative-statics conclusions. In fact, Amir and Lambson have shown 
for homogeneous goods that the only relevant condition for decreasing equilibrium 
prices and increasing equilibrium total quantity is that there are no strong increasing 
returns to scale.
One of the fundamental conclusions of this literature is that stability o f equi­
librium is closely connected to Mnon-paradcodcaT comparative statics results. Our 
analysis for heterogeneous goods, which is based on lattice-theoretic monotone com­
parative statics methods, makes precise predictions for maximal and minimal equi­
libria that do not rely on stability, while we show that comparative statics results 
for arbitrary equilibria continue to depend decisively on the stability o f equilibrium.
In this work we will concentrate exclusively on the comparative statics o f entry. 
Our main result is that if competitors’ quantities enter inverse demand in some 
aggregated form, then equilibrium prices do not increase as more firms enter the 
industry. We also show by means o f an example that this result is not extendable
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to general heterogenous goods, i.e. equilibrium prices may rise even if there are no 
increasing returns to scale and equilibrium is stable.
Total equilibrium output may rise or fall even if prices are decreasing, but will 
rise under the same condition that we already used to rule out asymmetric equi­
libria. Individual output rises or falls depending on whether goods are strategic 
complements or substitutes, while profits always decrease.
The rest of our paper continues as follows: Section 3.2 sets out the model, and 
section 3.3 introduces the main condition. Existence results are presented in section 
1, and related conditions and some examples are discussed in sections 3.5 and 3.6. 
Section 3.7 presents our comparative statics results, and section 3.8 concludes. All 
proofs are in the appendix.
3.2 The Model
There are n firms with identical finite production capacities1 0 < K <  oo and 
identical production cost functions c : [0, K] —► R+, which are assumed to be lower 
semi-continuous.
Denote firm i ’s output quantity by x*, and by x„< the vector of outputs of the 
other firms. Inverse demand o f firm i (i =  l..n ) is given by a continuous function 
p : [0,K]n —► R+, with.pj =  p (x*,x_*),2 which is symmetric in the other firms* 
outputs: Let x_< be any permutation o f x_,, then p (xt, £_<) =  p (x itx_i) for all 
(x i,x -i) € [0, K]n. That is, firms are completely symmetric in that, apart from 
identical production technologies, all demand functions have the same functional 
form and all competitors* goods enter each demand function symmetrically. Assume 
that p is nonincreasing in x(- and x_,-, i.e. in particular goods are substitutes, and
1 Alternatively, as is often done, one may assume that inverse demand falls below marginal cost
(given any output o f rivals) or even becomes zero for outputs larger than a certain limit. All these
assumptions ensure that firms' outputs are bounded.
2By p(xi,  X - i )  we do mean that x, is the first argument o f p, i.e. that for all i own quantity x,
enters firm i ’s inverse demand differently from other firms' quantities Xj, j  ^  t.
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strictly decreasing in xt- where inverse demand is positive.
Firm t’s profits are, for X i  G [0, K ]  and given € [0, iv]"-1,
n  (Xi, x -i) =  Xip (Xi, x „i) -  c (Xi), i =  1 . . .  n. (3.1)
We will now reformulate profits II as a function of firm Vs market price pi and the 
other firms’ outputs3. As shown in the appendix, there is a set X  C R+. x [0, K}n~l 
such that we can express firm Vs output as a function x  ■' X  —► [0, K] of own market 
price pi and the others’ output that is continuous and nonincreasing in (pj,x_*) € X , 
and strictly decreasing in p,. Also, there is a new constraint set tt (x_,) that is non­
empty, closed, compact, and nonincreasing in x_i. Firm Vs maximization problem 
can then be expressed as
ma f t  (pi,X-i)  =  x ( P u x - i ) P i - c (X<J>i,X-i)),  (3-2)Pi€w(x_i)
resulting in the price best response4 P  (x_, ).
If we consider profits fi (pi, x .j )  ” on the diagonal” where all competitors produce 
the same amount y  G [0, A ], we can define
f l f a y )  =  ft(Pt (3.3)
Some special cases are, in order o f increasing specialization, what we will call 
” Competitor aggregation”, ” industry aggregation”,5 and homogeneous goods. Under 
competitor aggregation there are functions p : R+ —*■ R+ and ƒ : [0, K]n~l —► R+, 
where ƒ is strictly increasing, such that
p  (x 4 ,  x_i) =  p  {xit ƒ (x _ ,)) ,  (3.4)
where the competitors’ quantities are aggregated into one number. One example is 
additive aggregation with ƒ (x_<) =  Yi =  Ej&Xj.
3 N ote that the variable to  be maximized over (output or price) is irrelevant as long as afterwards
each firm ’commits* to  a fixed production quantity or at least com petitors believe that it is so.
4 We adopt this formulation to  avoid confusion with the standard (quantity) best response or
reaction function X i = r  (x_<).
5I would like to  thank Karl Schlag for proposing these terms.
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Under industry aggregation there exists a function p : R+ —► R+ and ¿ e l L  
such that
P (*•» * -i) =  P (Xi +  6Yi) , (3.5)
and if goods are homogeneous then <5 =  1.
For industry aggregation it is easy to see that X (P i,x_j) =  D (pi) — 6Yi, where 
D =  p~l is the demand function, and the profit maximization problem becomes
X~i] =  {D(P') ~ SY')Pi ~ C (D  ~  6Yi) ’ 
where for identical outputs by firm t’s competitors,
n(Pi,y) = (D (Pi) -  s (n -  1 )y )p i -c (D { j> i ) -6 ( n -  1 )y ) .
3.3 The Condition
Our main condition on profits is o f a type that has recently been shown to be 
of central importance in any exercise o f comparative statics: In a lattice-theoretic 
context, Milgrom and Shannon (1994) have shown that the set o f maximizers of the 
parametric maximization problem ma x<zs f  (x,£)> where S C R , is nondecreasing 
in (t, 5) if and only if ƒ satisfies the weak single crossing property in (x, t): for all 
a /> x  and t! > t  we have that
In the context o f game theory this result can be applied to  best response maps, and 
we do so after our change of variables from own quantity to own price described 
above. Underlying our results is the following condition:
Condition A: ft (pt, y) satisfies the dual6 weak single crossing property in (p\,y), i.e. 
for all & >  pi and xf > y we have that
ft (pi>y) -  ft (pi, y) < (< ) o => ft (ji, l/) -  ft (Pi> if) £  (<) (3*6)
6This is a "dual”  single-crossing property because the inequality signs in the definition ore 
reversed.
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Even though this condition seems to be extremely abstract, its interpretation is
very simple and economically intuitive: Condition A means that, starting from a 
situation where all other firms produce identical quantities. if the other firms raise 
their outputs by the same amount, it will be advantageous for firm i to adjust its 
output only in such a way that the resulting market price is not higher than before. 
Doing so, own output may increase or decrease, depending on whether goods are 
strategic substitutes or complements. This condition is a very natural condition to 
consider when one is interested in how equilibrium prices changes with entry of new' 
firms in a setting where all firms are equal; here we will show that it even implies 
existence of equilibrium, subject to some regularity conditions.
Note that condition A imposes the dual single crossing property only on the 
"diagonal” , i.e. where competitors all produce the same quantity. This is sufficient 
for the following existence result since we are only interested in symmetric equilibria, 
while we will have to state a condition covering the whole space of outputs to deal 
with asymmetric equilibria.
In addition, condition A  is formulated for identical increases in output for all 
competitors. This is equivalent to formulating the corresponding condition in terms 
of an increase in just one competitor’s quantity as long as inverse demand is sym­
metric in competitors’ outputs, while it is more general if inverse demand is not 
symmetric. Condition A therefore even applies to cases where firms are identical 
but inverse demands are not symmetric in all competitors’ outputs. One example 
o f this is a situation where each firm only has two neighbors, as in a "circular city” 
model. In this paper we will concentrate on the symmetric case.
It is important to note that condition A  rules out the existence of avoidable 
fixed cost, i.e. fixed costs that are not incurred if nothing is produced: If they were 
present, firm i might prefer to stop producing at all (in effect raising own price), 
instead of lowering its own price, if the other firms raise their outputs. Any other 
upward jump in production cost is similarly excluded.
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ICondition A applies no matter whether inverse demand and production costs are 
differentiable or not. Since it is an ordinal condition, it is not surprising that there 
is no equivalent condition in terms o f derivatives even if demand or cost are differ­
entiable. Using the method of dissection discussed in Milgrom and Shannon (1994, 
p. 167), we can find a sufficient differential condition that is slightly stronger than 
condition A (see appendix 3.A.2). If IP* and IT-* are the second partial derivatives 
o f the profit function o f firm i with respect to outputs, and p1 and p3 the partial 
derivatives o f the inverse demand of firm i with respect to Xi and Xj, condition A is 
implied by
Condition AD: For all i, X* € [0, K ] , and x_* =  (y, ...,y ) €  (0, A ']"“ 1,
n* (**,*-<) pj IF  (x*,x_t) <  0. (3.7)
In the cases o f industry aggregates or homogeneous goods, condition AD reduces 
to the condition (as we discuss in section 3.6) pf — c" <  0. Here condition AD has 
the following interpretation: There are at most weakly increasing returns to scale, 
or profit margins p — d are falling in own output7 The relation between conditions 
AD and A is as follows: If output by the other firms increases marginally, and if firm 
i reduces output such that its market price remains constant, then firm t’s profits 
decrease by the profit margin (p — d), which is a first-order effect; since by condition 
AD profit margins are decreasing in own output, this decrease in profits can only be 
counterbalanced by an increase in own output and a resulting lower market price, 
therefore firm i will not want to drive prices up. Best response output may go up 
or down since there are two opposite movements in output involved.
An interesting implication of condition AD is that it implies a bound on the
7An equivalent interpretation, due to Am ir and Lambeon (1998) for homogenous goods is that, 
"inverse demand or price decreases faster (...) at any given output level than does marginal cost 
at all lower output levels."
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slopes of quantity best responses r< (#-*),
— r -  ( x  • )  =  — —  >9xj ' { ) II" “  p -'
Apart from condition AD there are various other conditions that imply condition 
A and that may sometimes be easier to verify. Some we will discuss in the next 
section, but the one most easily verified is the following:8
Condition D: n  has (weakly) decreasing differences in (pt,X-i). i.e.
n ( p ' ,  x ' _ . )  -  n ( ? ( ,  x ' _ , )  <  n ( p < ,  x _ f )  -  n ( p ^  x . ( )  ( 3 . 8 )
for all p( > pi > 0 and xL,- > x_j € [0, if]"-1.
This condition is strictly stronger than condition A (Milgrom and Shannon 1994). 
If inverse demand and production casts are twice continuously differentiable, this is 
equivalent to (see appendix 3.A.3), for all j  ^
d2
dpidxj n (p ^ x_ i) <  o,
or
ip  -  + (pi + xp* -  c') ? p" < o. (3.9)
The last term in (3.9) disappears if goods are industry aggregates {p’p** —p*ptj — 0), 
or at interior best responses (p, +  xp1 — d =  0), leading to condition AD.
3.4 Existence of Equilibria
We will now state our main result on the existence o f symmetric pure Cournot equi­
libria. In addition to condition A  stated above, we need some regularity conditions 
to ensure that the decision problem o f each firm has an optimal solution:
Condition R (Regularity): 1. Production capacity K is limited: 0 < K  < oo;
2. production cost c (x<) is lower semi-continuous;
8 Here x’_i > X-i means that x'- > Xj for all j  £ i.
3. inverse demand p (x¿,x_i) ¿5 continuous in (x„x_*).
Multiple symmetric equilibria can be ranked according to equilibrium quantities 
(or prices). If there is a symmetric equilibrium where quantities are smaller (higher) 
than in any other symmetric equilibrium, this equilibrium is called minimal ( maxi­
mal).
Theorem  1 Assume that inverse demand is nonincreasing in all arguments (goods 
are substitutes), and strictly decreasing in own output while inverse demand is pos­
itive. Under conditions R and A there exist maximal and minimal symmetric pure 
Cournot equilibria.
From a technical point of view, at the heart of theorem 1 lies the fact that under 
condition A  the price best response P  (x_¿) has nonincreasing maximal and minimal 
selections, which allows for the construction of nondecreasing maps from the space 
of prices into itself. Tarsky’s (1955) theorem, which states that any nondecreasing 
map from an interval into itself has a fixed point, can then be applied to show 
that maximal and minimal fixed points exist. These result in maximal and minimal 
symmetric pure strategy Cournot equilibria.
The equilibrium is unique if and only if the maximal and minimal equilibria are 
identical, but this cannot be established without further assumptions. Under the 
strong assumption that profits are quasiconcave, multiple symmetric equilibria can 
be excluded if one assumes that the slopes of quantity best reactions are smaller 
than 1 / (n — 1), which follows in particular if all equilibria are stable (see appendix 
3.A.4). On the other hand, using stronger versions of condition A and a weak 
additional condition B, one can exclude the existence of asymmetric equilibria.
Let us state two conditions related to condition A, both of which are strictly 
stronger and involve the whole space o f competitors* outputs [0, K]n~lm. For all 
i =  l...n ,
Condition AS: ft (p¿, x_¿) satisfies the dual strict single crossing property in
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for all x -i € [0, K]n For all > pi and x'_t > x_*.
ft (p ',* -») -  ft (pi, x ^ ) <  0 =► ft (p ',*'_*) -  ft (p i,xV ) < 0. (3.10)
Condition ASD: dTl/dpi exists, and is strictly decreasing in x3 for all j  ^  t, 
where p (x i,x _ j) is positive and for all x_* 6 [0, iC]n_1.
Condition AS means that a firm will not raise any best response market price as 
a reaction to an increase in competitors’ outputs (as opposed to just maximum and 
minimum best response prices under condition A ). Condition ASD implies that a 
firm will strictly decrease its market price as a reaction to an increase in competitors’ 
outputs and is stronger than conditions A  and AS, and even stronger than weakly 
or strictly decreasing differences o f profits (see Edlin and Shannon 1998a).
Let be the vector o f outputs o f firms k ^  i, j .  The additional conditions on 
inverse demands are:
Condition BW  (weak): For all j  ^  i, all (xj,X j-,x_y) 6 [0, K]n, and all e >  0,
P fa  +  £, < p (x<, Xj *f £, x _fy).
Condition BS (strict): For all j  ^  i, all (x y x ^ x -y ) € [OjA]", and all e > 0, 
p(xi 4- £ ,X j,x_y) <  p (x,, x3 +  £ ,x _y ), where the inequality is strict when p(xiyXj +  
£,X_y) > 0.
If inverse demand is differentiable these conditions correspond to p* <  p7 and 
px <  p7, respectively. Conditions BW  and BS mean that each firm’s changes in 
quantity in uence its own market price more than the same changes in other firms* 
quantities, which is a very reasonable assumption as firms are symmetric. Note 
that the case o f homogeneous goods, where pl =  p7 =  j f , falls under condition BW. 
In fact, both these conditions follow from utility maximization of a representative 
consumer: If inverse demands are derived from maximizing a (strictly) concave 
utility function 17, where at the optimum Pi =  dU/dxi, then the condition p* <  p7 
(p* <  p7) follows from the (strict) definiteness o f the Hessian and the symmetry of 
the demand functions.9
9N ote that p* =  dPU/docf, p7 =  cPU/dxidxj, and that the determinant o f every 2x2 minor o f
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With these conditions, we have the following proposition:
P roposition  2 Asymmetric equilibria do not exist if either 1. or 2. holds:
1. Conditions AS and BS hold.
2. Conditions ASD and BW hold.
For homogeneous goods we must assume condition ASD (including the assump­
tion that profits are differentiable) to rule out asymmetric equilibria, while for het­
erogeneous goods the weaker condition AS is enough. On the other hand, condition 
AS must be accompanied with the slightly stricter condition BS.
3.5 Related conditions
In the following we will discuss the conditions which have been used so far to establish 
existence of Cournot equilibrium and their relation to condition A. In general, strong 
conditions on payoffs, like concavity or quasiconcavity, yield existence in arbitrary 
games, see Friedman (1977, 1991), but are difficult to translate into economically 
meaningful statements about demand or cost.
Spence (1976) presents a class of demand functions with a special functional 
structure where Cournot equilibria can be found maximizing a certain ’wrong1 sur­
plus function. Here the question o f existence of Nash equilibria reduces to the 
question of existence of maxima of this function. Slade (1994) finds a necessary 
and sufficient condition for this relation between equilibria and maxima to exist, 
and shows that for homogeneous goods such functions exist if and only if demand 
is linear, while there are more general cases for heterogeneous goods.
Most work has concentrated on economically meaningful conditions on demand 
or cost, or both. Unsurprisingly, practically all are related with either one or the
the Hessian must be non-negative (positive):
( p f  - ( p*)* > ( > ) » .
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other of Hahn’s (1962) pair of stability conditions,
p '  — c" < 0, p ! + x t f <  0, (3.11)
or in our notation
ir * < I P , n ° < 0 ,  j ? i .  (3.12)
For homogeneous goods, McManus (1962, 1964) and Roberts and Sonnenschein 
(1976) prove existence of symmetric pure Cournot equilibrium assuming that pro­
duction costs were convex, while Szidarovsky and Yakowitz (1977 ) additionally 
assume that inverse demand is concave. Kukushkin (1993), assuming convex cost, 
shows existence of pure symmetric equilibria if outputs are discrete variables.10 If 
demand is nonincreasing, from the assumption o f convex costs follows that pf—dl <  0 
or IT* < Uij (i 7^  j ) ,  i.e. the first o f Halm’s stability conditions. Amir and Lambson
(1998) , again for homogeneous goods, directly assume this, and prove existence of 
pure symmetric Cournot equilibria. Their work is important in several respects: It 
shows that the assumption of convex costs can be relaxed, and that the relevant con­
dition pf — d* <  0 is lattice-theoretic in nature. As one can see from condition AD, 
our condition A  is a direct generalization to heterogenous goods of this condition.
The second o f Hahn’s stability conditions, p! -f xpf* <  0 or IP  < 0, means that 
marginal revenue does not increase if competitors raise their outputs, i.e. that goods 
are strategic substitutes in the terminology of Bulow et ai. (1985). More generally, 
goods being strategic substitutes is equivalent to profits n  having weakly
decreasing differences in outputs (x^XjJ, for j  ^  i. This condition is not related to 
our condition A.
For homogeneous goods, Novshek (1985) shows that (possibly non-symmetric) 
Cournot equilibria exist if goods are strategic substitutes. Van Long and Soubeyran
(1999) prove existence and uniqueness o f Cournot equilibria under strategic substi­
tutes and convex cost. For general aggregative games, i.e. ’’ competitor aggregation” ,
10 Mixed equilibria always exist if outputs are discrete.
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Corch6n (199-1 , 1996) imposes a generalization of Hahn’s conditions, which can be 
written as 11”  < IT-* <  0, and proves existence through the concavity of pavofls, 
while Kukushkin (1994) only assumes strategic substitutes.
For strategic complements, i.e. weakly increasing differences of IT (xt, x_,) in 
outputs ( it ,Xj) for j  ^  t, or IIV > 0 (j  i) under differentiability, Vives (1990), 
shows existence of pure Cournot equilibria for heterogeneous goods (symmetric with 
symmetric firms) in the general context of supermodular games.
The most intuitive way to characterize both strands o f literature is to express 
all conditions used in terms of slopes o f (quantity) reaction functions r (x_«): As­
suming that profits are twice differentiable, we obtain r' (x_ j) =  -IP-*/IT*. The 
first strand of literature effectively assumes that this slope is bounded below by — 1, 
while strategic substitutes (complements) imply that r* <  (> ) 0. Our condition AD 
in general implies r' > ~pp /pi, which is equal to —1 under homogeneous goods, and 
larger than —1 under condition BS.
While condition A generalizes the first part of the literature, its relation with 
the second group is not straightforward. For homogeneous goods the assumption o f 
strategic complements implies condition A if profits are (at least locally) concave. 
Since profits are locally concave at interior best responses, this result captures the 
fact that reaction functions certainly have slope larger than —1 if they are nonde­
creasing. For heterogeneous goods this relationship is not clear.
Figures 1-3 summarize the relations between the various conditions mentioned 
above according to their implications on the slopes o f best responses, which for sim­
plicity are assumed to be differentiable. Most conditions only apply to homogeneous 
goods or "com petitor aggregation” .
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3.6 Examples
3.6.1 Linear Cournot Oligopoly
Consider the class o f Cournot models with heterogeneous linear demand and linear 
cost functions, with p* =* A  — Bxi — CY\, where V* =  and B  >  Q. Goods
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are substitutes for C >  0, and homogeneous if C =  B. Condition AD is always 
satisfied since IIM =  —2B, ITJ =  —C, and 11“ — (p '/p 7) IT-7 =  — B <  0. On the other 
hand, condition D is equivalent to strategic substitutes if goods are substitutes: 
n ,J =  — C, and =  - C/B, and both expressions are negative. Assuming
w.l.o.g. that marginal costs are zero, equilibrium prices p(nj =  A B f (2B + (n — 1)C ) 
are decreasing in the number o f firms if goods are substitutes.
3.6.2 Industry Aggregation
Here the demand function is of the type p(x + SY), and under differentiability 
condition AD becomes
0
which is equal to the condition p  — d* <  0 under homogeneous goods. Note that the 
lower bound on the slope of the quantity reaction function becomes r7 (K) >  —6. If 
<5 < 1 there are no asymmetric equilibria since for their existence it is necessary that 
the slope is —1 or smaller.
3.6.3 Non-aggregative demand
Here we give an example that shows that there are reasonable assumptions on con­
sumers’ preferences that give rise to inverse demand functions that do not allow 
aggregation o f competitors’ quantities (demand is non-aggregative).
Let the utility of a representative consumer be quasi-linear, and depend on a 
numeraire good y  and n other goods Xi, ...,x „ in the following form:
U — J/ 4* (x$ xt2/2 ) + £?=1 In (1 -  XiXj) ,
U (.) is a generalized quadratic utility function (Spence 1976).
At the consumer’s optimum we have dU/dx* =  pi for t =  1. . .  n, therefore the 
inverse demand functions are defined on x  € [0, l]n, with
/ . dU — Xj
P (^ *>3L.») — n — 1OXi * 1  —  X tX y
77
while dU/dxi >  0, and zero otherwise. W ith zero production cost, condition AD is 
satisfied ’’ on the diagonal” Xj =  x, j  ^  i since p is twice differentiable and it can be 
shown that
If* -  ¿ I F  =  (n - 1 ~ x ? ) g2 +  ( 1 ~ 2 x *g )2 < o
P’  (1 -  XiX)2
In the next section we give an example o f a non-aggregative inverse demand function 
that does not fall in Spence’s class.
3.7 Effects of Entry
A long-standing point of interest has been the question whether Cournot equilibrium 
approaches a competitive equilibrium as more firms enter the market. It has become 
common to call a Cournot equilibrium quasi-competitive if equilibrium total quantity 
is increasing or price is decreasing in the number o f firms. It it easy to see that for 
heterogeneous goods there is not necessarily a strict inverse relation between total 
quantity and market prices even if goods are symmetric. Since the sum of outputs 
makes less sense as a measure o f quasi-competitiveness for heterogeneous goods 
precisely because outputs are not o f the same good, we argue that the more useful 
measure is whether market prices are decreasing.
One should note that with heterogeneous goods the entry of a new competitor 
raises the number of goods (and welfare if consumers value variety), which in general 
may have surprising effects. As we will see in the following, under competitor aggre­
gation the conventional wisdom (equilibrium prices decrease after entry) prevails, 
while for more general forms o f heterogeneity this need no longer be true.
A t first we will restrict attention to competitor aggregation. Assume there is 
a countable number o f identical firms that may enter in the market11. Let ƒ : 
[0, K]°° —* F  C RU {o o } be continuous, strictly increasing, and symmetric in its
11 Since we are not interested in determ ining a free entry equilibrium , fixed cost o f entry are 
irrelevant.
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arguments: Let x_, be a permutation of x_i € [0, then f  ( i - i )  =  ƒ Let
inverse demand be given by
P  =  P ( x , J  (3 -1 3 )
where x 6 [0, K}°° and p : [0, K] x F  —► R+ is continuous and nondecreasing 
in (xt, ƒ,), and strictly decreasing in its first argument while inverse demand is 
positive. For competitor aggregation, industry aggregation and homogeneous goods 
the simplest definition of ƒ is ƒ (x_,) =
Under condition A, the existence o f symmetric Cournot equilibria follows from 
theorem 1, therefore the following comparative statics conclusions are not empty.
Theorem  3 Under competitor aggregation the following holds:
1. Under condition A maximal and minimal equilibrium prices are nonincreasing 
in the number of firms n.
2. Under condition ASD, and ifp is strictly decreasing inxj for allj ^  i
while pi > Qf then maximal and minimal equilibrium prices are strictly decreasing in 
the number of firms n as long as they are positive.
Some remarks are in order: As noted above, even if n  is differentiable, condition 
ASD, the condition that dfl/dpi exists and is strictly decreasing in Xj for all j  ^  i, 
is strictly stronger than condition A or even strictly decreasing differences o f II in 
(pt,x_j) (see Edlin and Shannon 1998a).
Second, our method also can say something about the comparative statics of 
symmetric equilibria that are interior , i.e. characterized by first-order conditions, 
if they are stable equilibria in the usual definition as asymptotically stable equilibria 
under some classes o f adjustment mechanisms. Hahn (1962) and Seade (1980 ) 
gave sufficient conditions for stability, while Seade also gave sufficient conditions for 
instability o f Cournot equilibria: Equilibria with n firms are stable if the slopes o f 
best reactions lie between the following bounds:
- K ^ j r  (*_ ,) =  —n « / i r  < 1 / (n - 1 ) ,  j  *  i, (3.14)
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and instable if
£ ~ r  ( i - i )  =  - I F / I F  > 1 / (n -  1 ), j  *  i. (3.15)
Define g (x, n) =  ƒ ( x , x ,  0 ,...), where n firms all produce x, and the others noth­
ing.
C orollary 4 Under competitor aggregation, let inverse demand and production cost 
be twice continuously differentiable, and let g (x, n) be differentiable in n with partial 
derivative gn > 0. If condition AD holds then at interior equilibria the equilibrium 
price is nonincreasing in the number of firms if the equilibrium under consideration 
is stable. If equilibrium price is increasing then the equilibrium is unstable.
In the appendix we show, making explicit use of the aggregation, that
^P(n) _  9nP2 (  rrit   P tt»j\
dn II" +  (n — 1) IF* \ p> )  ' (3.16)
where the second factor is non-positive by condition AD, and the first one is positive 
if the equilibrium is stable. Therefore dp^/dn is non-positive under condition AD 
and stability.
In the following schematic portrait o f the fixed point map rp (p) determining 
equilibrium prices, which was used in the proof of theorem 1, the TnarimAl and 
minimal equilibria (fixed points) are stable, and equilibrium prices decrease when 
we shift the map downwards to the dotted curve; the interior fixed point corresponds 
to an unstable equilibrium and indeed equilibrium prices increase.12
12 We show in appendix 3.A .4 that equilibria are unstable if the fixed point map cuts the diagonal 
from below.
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It can be shown that if n  (pt, y) satisfies the (non-dual) weak single-crossing prop­
erty in (pi, 3/), then extremal equilibrium prices are nondecreasing, which demon­
strates that condition A is critical for establishing quasi-competitiveness (see the 
proof of theorem 3).
Fourth, theorem 3 and corollary 4 do not extend to the case of non-aggregative 
demands, as the following example shows: Assume there are n  firms with production 
capacity K  > 1/2 and zero production cost. Inverse demands are p (x ,, x_*) =  1 — 
Xi — Ej^i (1 — e~XiX*) where this expression is positive, and otherwise p (xi, x_<) =  0. 
Symmetric equilibrium outputs are given by the first-order constraint (sufficient 
second-order conditions are satisfied)
2 -  2x — n 4- (n — 1) (l — x2) e~ * *  =  0,
which for each value o f n > 1 has exactly one solution X (n) <  1/2. Therefore for each 
n there is exactly one symmetric equilibrium which at the same time is minimal, 
mavimal and interior. On the diagonal Xj =  x (j  ^  i) condition AD is fulfilled since
IT  -  =  -x x  <  0 ,
P
and the equilibrium is stable according to the above definition since
IT  +  (n -  1) IP ' =  - 2  -  2 (n - 1) x  (2  -  **) e ~*2 <  0 .
Still, equilibrium prices fall until n =  3, and then rise:
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The reason for this maybe perplexing result is that the fixed-point maps defining 
successive equilibria are shifted upwards instead o f downwards for n > 3 since the 
reduction in individual output best responses caused by the entrant is outweighed 
by a corresponding reduction in competitors ’ outputs (see the argument in appendix
3.A.4). Note that the traditional comparative statics analysis based on the implicit 
function theorem, which in appendix 3.A .4 we extend to the case of competitor 
aggregation, is not applicable here since inverse demand cannot be written as a 
differentiable function of the number o f firms.
There are three other variables o f interest whose equilibrium values vary with the 
number of firms: Total output, individual outputs, and firm profits. In supermodular 
games, i.e. games with strategic complements, equilibrium strategies and individual 
payofis rise with the number o f players, see Topkis (1998), theorem 4.2.3. In Cournot 
oligopoly the comparative statics o f individual quantities, total quantities and profits 
each depend on a different condition.
We state the comparative statics results about quantities for competitor aggrega­
tion. Let us assume that inverse demand and production cost are twice continuously 
differentiable, and concentrate on interior equilibria, i.e. equilibria characterized by 
first order conditions. This is sufficient for our purposes since we want to make the 
simple point that conditions A  or AD  do not drive the results.
C orollary 5 Under condition AD, consider any interior equilibrium where equilib­
rium prices P(n) are decreasing in the number o f firms n.
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1. Under condition BS total equilibrium output Q(n) is strictly increasing in n.
2. Individual equilibrium quantities X(n) are decreasing (increasing} in n if goods 
arc strategic substitutes (complements).
Without proof we note that to both comparative statics results there corresponds 
an own differencing condition on profits: For total quantity, it is that
n {Q ix—i) — n (q SjyHXji
has nondecreasing differences in (Q, Xj) for all j  ^  i, and for individual quantities 
that II has nonincreasing (nondecreasing) differences in (xt, Xj) for all j  ^  i.
These could of course be generalized to single-crossing conditions.
On the other hand, condition A is sufficient to show that individual profits are 
decreasing:
C orollary 6 Under condition A individual profits II(n) in maximal and minimal 
equilibria are nonincreasing in the number of firms n, and strictly decreasing if 
inverse demand p (x iyfi) is strictly decreasing in fi.
Total firm profits, i.e. the sum o f profits o f all firms in the industry, may be increasing 
or decreasing.
The different effects of an increase in the number o f firms on prices and quantities 
are summarized in the following two figures, where ’+ ’ ( - ’ ) means that the variable 
is going up (down):
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3.7.1 Related conditions
Most o f the early literature on quasi-competitiveness, i.e. Frank (1965 ), Ruffin 
(1971), Seade (1980), Szidarovsky and Yakowitz (1982), all for homogeneous goods, 
assume both II*J =  j /  +  xjf' <  0 (strategic substitutes) and j /  — c" <  0 (condition 
AD for homogeneous goods), and show that equilibrium market prices decrease as 
more firms enter. Corchôn (1994, 1996) generalizes these conditions and results to 
general aggregative games; in the special case o f Cournot competition his conditions
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are
n M < IF  < 0 ,
where the first inequality corresponds to jf — c" <  0 for homogeneous goods.
Not until in Amir and Lambson (1998) it became clear that the only condition 
relevant for quasi-competitiveness with homogeneous goods is jf — c" <  0. As their 
work is based on lattice theory they can identify the conditions that are critical for 
their conclusions, and avoid unnecessary ones like strategic substitutes and concav­
ity.13 Our condition AD is a generalization to heterogeneous goods o f the classical 
condition ft — d' < 0 , and condition A  applies in more general contexts.14
Now we will give a simple example under homogeneous goods that shows that 
under condition A  equilibrium prices go down, while under its ’opposite’ they go 
up. Let inverse demand be given by p (Q) =  3 — 2Q, therefore goods are strategic 
substitutes.
First assume that marginal cost is constant with c (x ) =  lx . Then equilib­
rium price is pn =  (6 *f n) /2  (1 +  n) which is strictly decreasing and converges to 
d (0) =  min* c (x) /x  =  1/2, and therefore to the competitive outcome. Condition A  
is satisfied since j/ — d' ~ —2 < 0.
For strongly increasing returns to scale, for example c (x ) — \x — p x 2 (for 
x < 1/2) equilibrium price pn — (5n — 3) /  ( l O n  — 1) is strictly increasing in the 
number o f firms and converges to d (0) =  1/2 > min c (x) /x =  0. Condition A  rules 
this case out since ƒ/ — df — —2 +  44/20 =  1/5 > 0.
13 De Meza (1985) and Villanova, Paradis and Viader (1999) exhibit examples where n-firm 
oligopoly prices are decreasing (therefore quasi-competitive according to  the definition used here) 
but are higher than the m onopoly price. This outcome is due to  the assumption o f increasing
returns to scale in production that only set in for large output quantities.
14 An issue that is related but different from quasi-competitiveness is the issue o f convergence
of equilibrium to  the 'com petitive prioe'. Ruffin (1971 ), following McManus (1964) and R ank 
(1965), shows that the Cournot equilibrium prioe converges to the com petitive equilibrium price if 
and only if there are no increasing returns to  scale.
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Figure 7
3.8 Conclusions
Using a lattice theory-based approach, we established the existence of pure sym­
metric Cournot equilibria for homogeneous or heterogeneous goods under a simple 
condition that generalizes the condition o f weakly increasing returns used in the 
literature for the case of homogeneous goods. We were able to rule out asymmetric 
equilibria using a weak additional condition.
Under our main condition maximal and minimal equilibrium prices are decreas­
ing in the number of firms if competitors1 quantities enter inverse demand as an 
aggregate, but may be increasing if inverse demand is non-aggregative. We obtain 
the same result for stable interior equilibria. Total quantity increases with the num­
ber o f firms under the same additional condition as above, while individual quantities 
increase (decrease) if goods are strategic complements (substitutes). Individual firm 
profits are decreasing after entry. These results show quite clearly that each com­
parative statics result depends on a different critical condition, and therefore model 
builders striving for generality should attempt to only include the assumptions that 
drive the comparative statics results that they really need.
One topic for further research is to extend our methods (and maybe some results) 
to cases where product heterogeneity is not symmetric, as e.g. in Hotelling models, 
or to models with exogenous or endogenous quality differences.
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Second, similar results will certainly be obtained by applying corresponding con­
ditions to models of heterogenous price competition, which to some extent already 
have been treated.
3.A  Appendix
3.A.1 Change of variable in the profit function
In this appendix we discuss thoroughly the properties of the function \ (pn *-*) that 
is used to change the decision variable from own quantity to market price in the profit 
function. The important points are: monotonicity and continuity of x (}\, 2-*), and 
convexity, closedness and monotonicity of the constraint set 7T (x_{).
Let minimum and maximum prices be p# =  p (K , K ) and po =  ( 0 , 0 ) ,  and 
the interval of possible prices with outputs by the other firms fixed
7T (x-0 = [p (K, x_i) ,p (0, x-i)], x-i e  [0, K]n~l . (3.17)
The set it (x_») is the new constraint set for the maximization over p,, obviously 
non-empty, compact and convex, and is descending (nonincreasing) in x_j (in the 
strong set order, see Milgrom and Shannon (1994)) since p (., x_*) is nonincreasing 
in x_*.
The range o f possible combinations between market price and the others’ outputs 
is
X  = {(Pi,x-i) € [pk,Po] X [O, * ] " '1 Ip* e 7T (x-i)} . (3.18)
Let x (x_,) be the maximum output that firm i will produce given that the other 
firms are already producing x_*, either because this output is equal to capacity, or 
because inverse demand becomes zero:
x  (x_() =  min { if , min {x  € [0, K] |p(x,x_i) =  0 }} >  0. (3.19)
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Then since p is strictly decreasing and continuous on x* 6 [0, x  (x_,-)J, we can express 
firm i's output as a function o f market price and the others' output \ : Ar —♦ [0, K\ 
that is continuous and nonincreasing in (p ,,x_i) € A", and strictly decreasing in pt 
with image [0,x (x_i)] for each x^i € [0, /C]"-1 .15
3.A.2 Dissection condition
In this appendix we derive a differential condition that is sufficient for condition 
A to hold. Assume that inverse demand and production costs are twice continu­
ously differentiable. We apply the method of dissection described in Milgrom and 
Shannon (1994, p. 167). This method works as follows: The effect o f an increase 
in own price Pi on profits is ” dissected” into two parts, a beneficial effect due to a 
price increase (higher revenue per unit and lower total production cost due to the 
associated decrease in demand), and a costly effect due to the effect of the decrease 
in demand on revenue. To these effects are associated the price variables p+ and p~, 
respectively. Profits are written as
V  ( p ~ , p + , y )  = p + x ( p ' . y .  • • > ! / ) - c ( x ( p + , 2 / , . . , y ) ) ,
where
7 p = p ' V <  o. ^  =  x - ^ x r > o ,
where xp =  dx/dpi =  l/p* <  0 (superscripts denote partial derivatives). Then 
II fe , y) satisfies the dual weak single crossing property in (pt, y), i.e. condition A, 
if (dU/ dp~) /  \dU/dp+\ is nonincreasing in y. We have, replacing p+ and p~ by pi, 
d dU/dp~ d piXp
dy | dU/dp' d y x ~  ¿X?
PiXpj (x  - c V )  -  PiXp (xj -  d'xjxr ~~ ¿Xpj)=  f a - 1 )
(x  -  ¿ x pf
(n — l)p i {xp)2 X
(X “  ¿Xp)‘
i ( L - < r - 2 L 2 ? L \ < o >
\xp x p x px3)
15 This is an application o f a continuous version o f the im plicit function theorem.
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where XJ =  <hc/dxj =  -p i/pi < 0, \VJ =  ^x/dpidxj =  ijPp" -  p{p'3) / {p ' f , and 
we have used the symmetry o f inverse demand with respect to opponents’ outputs. 
Therefore condition A holds if
_1_
Xp
X' XPJ t „ , ^piptt- p tpt3-------- - =  p ~ C 4- JET,------- :-----
X P X P X J  p J
(2p' +  XiP* -  c") -  (pi +  Xipij)
IF  -  t r i f  <  0, 
f  ~
where
IT* =  (x „ x _ t) =  2pi {xu x-i)  +  x<pri -  c (xt) ,
n ° ’ =  a ^ 7n  =  p 7 (x „x _ .)  +  x{pij (xit x_<).
3.A.3 The differential version of Condition D
Condition D holds if and only if
^ - n ( P i , i - 0  =  (i - c " x p) r ’ +  ( p , - c ' ) x ri
=  (pi - ^ ' )  +  ( P i - c ') x w
< 0-
In the special cases o f industry aggregation or homogeneous goods we have xPJ =  0, 
as can easily be seen:
x>j = i m ? - p m } / ( p ? = o .
3.A.4 Proofs
Existence o f  E quilibrium  
P roof. (Theorem 1).
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1. First we show that price best responses are well-defined given the regularity 
conditions. Given any vector of outputs G [0, K]n~l o f the other firms, firm Vs 
maximization problem is
ma n (p i,x_i) =  x (P i,s -i)P i “ c (x(P«.*-0)>piewix.i)
where x  is continuous in p,, c is lower semi-continuous, and
is a non-empty compact set. Then n  is an upper semi-continuous function of pt on 
the compact set 7r (x_*) and therefore attains its maximum. Thus the price best 
response P(x-i)  exists, where P : [0,iC]n_1 —* \p k >Po] is a correspondence that 
is symmetric in x_, since p(xi,x_*) is symmetric in x_,. Now restrict P to the 
’diagonal’ x_t- =  (y , ...,p), y G [0, K\, and define
P{y) — P(y> - ) 2/ ) » y € [Q,K].
2. Maximal and minimal price best responses in P  {y) are nonincreasing in y: The 
constraint set 7T (x_j) is descending, or decreasing in the strong set order, since both 
p (K, x_i) and p  (0, x_j) are nonincreasing in x_*. This follows from the assumptions 
that goods are substitutes and that p  (x^,x_i) is continuous in x_,. Invoking this 
fact and condition A, by Milgrom and Shannon’ s (1994 ) monotonicity theorem the 
set o f maximizers P  (y) is decreasing in y  in the strong set order. This implies in 
particular that maximum and minimum selections o f P  exist and are nonincreasing 
in y. Let P  : [0, K] —► \pK,Po] be a maximum or minimum selection, then P  is a 
nonincreasing function.
3. Continuation 1 (Fixed point in prices): Consider prices at identical outputs 
for all firms: Let
p (x) =  p (x ,x , . . ,x ) ,  x G  [0 ,A ].
Then p is nonincreasing since p  is nonincreasing in own output and because goods 
are substitutes. It is strictly decreasing while positive, and maps [0, K] onto [p/c,po]*
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Let x  be the largest symmetric output that all firms might produce in equilibrium 
(for all larger outputs less than capacity market price is zero),
x — min {A , min {x  e (0, A'] |p(x) =  0 }} ,
then the restricted p : [0,x] —♦ (pa',P o] is strictly decreasing and one-to-one, and has 
a strictly decreasing inverse \ '• \pK*Po} —1► [0,x] C (0, A-].
4. Construct a fixed point map: The map
$ (p) = P  (x  (? )), P € \pK,Po] (3.20)
is a nondecreasing function from [pK,Pb] into itself. By Tarsky’s (1955) theorem 
there is a fixed point p* =  \j) (p*).
5. The market price p* is attained in the market of firm * if all firms produce 
x* = xip*)- On the other hand, if all o f firm Vs competitors produce x*, then firm i 
adjusts production such that its best response market price is p*, with best response 
quantity x  (p * ,x * ,x * ) — x* because x  is strictly decreasing in p. Therefore a 
symmetric equilibrium exists where all firms produce x* and market price is p* in 
all markets.
3*. Continuation 2 (Fixed point in quantities): Given identical outputs y € [0, A ] 
for all competitors, quantity best responses r : [0, A] —+ [0, A ] are given by r (y) =  
X ( p  (y ) , y , y ' j . Then f  is continuous but for upward jumps, since % is continuous 
in all arguments, and decreasing in its first, while P  (x_j) is nonincreasing and 
therefore has no upward jumps, only downward jumps. Therefore r has a fixed 
point (Milgrom and Roberts 1994b, cor. 1), which is an equilibrium output. ■
Stability and Multiple Symmetric Equilibria
We will now prove that instability o f an equilibrium point corresponds to a slope 
larger than 1 of the fixed point map defining this equilibrium point, i.e. it cuts the 
diagonal from below. Note that since the fixed point map starts above the diagonal, 
multiple symmetric equilibria will exist if and only if it crosses the diagonal from
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below at least once. In particular, if the map jumps upwards over the diagonal 
(which cannot happen if profits are quasiconcave) then multiple symmetric equilib­
ria will exist and all of them may be stable. Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987) give 
necessary and sufficient conditions for uniqueness o f equilibrium with homogenous 
goods which boil down to jf — d' < 0 and Iln  +  (n — 1) II12 < 0 (stability). They 
do assume quasiconcavity of profits, and the above heuristic argument shows that 
this assumption is indispensable.
Remember the fixed point map used in the proof of theorem 1, rp (p) =  P (x (p)) 
on p € [pkjPo]- From maximizing profits over prices we find that
± P ( y )  =  ( »  -  1) ( - f r * / n * ) ,
A y (p) = ---------------- -
dp p* +  (n —l)p**
with
tf”  = 2Xr +  { p - d ) X” - d ' ( x )  (x'f
=  n” / ( P' ) 2
* * *3
where we used x” ’ =  —p"/ (p’ ) , and
n* = x j  +  i p - d ) x p j - c " ( x ) ^ ,x j
- ( i r - £ n « y / ( p f
if the first order condition X +  PXp ~  d  (x ) Xp =  0 holds. Then the slope o f the 
fixed-point map is
5jV>(p) =  { ¡ P { x ( p ) ) i p c ( p )
=  ( n ~ f ) (p* -f (n — l)p>) 11“  ’
which is larger than 1, i.e. the fixed point map cuts the diagonal from below, if and 
only if
IF  +  (n — 1) IF  >  0 ** (x^)  =  - I F / I F  >  1 / (n -  1 ),
i.e. if the equilibrium is unstable according to Seade (1980).
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Asym m etric equilibria 
P roof. (Proposition 2)
Consider an asymmetric equilibrium x  =  (x j,. . . ,  xn), where w.l.o.g. X\ =  y+e  > 
X2 =  y. Then xf={x2 ,x\,x%t.. Mi n) is also an equilibrium. For conciseness we 
now suppress the arguments (X3, . . .  ,x n). Equilibrium prices for firm 1 are p =  
p{y + s, y) and pf (j/, y +  £), with pf >  p by condition BS or pf >  p b}r condition BW.
First impose condition BS, leading to pf > p. Under condition AS, i.e. under 
the dual strict single-crossing property of firm fs  profit n  in (p,, p) for all i =  l..n , 
all selections of best price responses are non increasing, i.e. p/ < p since y + s > y, 
which is a contradiction to p' >  p.
For the second statement impose condition BW, leading to pf > p. Since under 
condition ASD for all i = l..n  the partial derivative dfl/dpi exists and is strictly 
decreasing in Xj (j  ^  i), price best responses are strictly decreasing in Xj (Theorem
2.8.5 in Topkis 1998). Therefore, since p is a best response at y and pf at y +  £ > y y 
we must have pf <  p, and again arrive at a contradiction. ■
Entry: Prices
Before giving the proof of theorem 3, we will shortly discuss why it is not possible 
to give a corresponding proof for the non-aggregative case. Let us pay attention to 
the dependence on the number of firms in the fixed point map (3.20) used in the 
proof of theorem 1:
i>(p,n) =  P (x (p ,n ) ,n )  (3.21)
Then there are two opposing effects of an increase in n: First, best price responses 
are lower since P  (x, n) is nonincreasing in n; second, the market price p can only be 
sustained if all firms produce less, since x  (p, n) is decreasing in n. The first effect 
moves ip downwards, while the second effect moves it upwards. Under aggregation 
the first effect is stronger, but this is hard to show here. In the following proof we
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avoid this difficulty by constructing a different fixed point map making strong use 
of the assumption of aggregation.
P roof. (Theorem 3)
1. Price best responses: Because competitors’ outputs are aggregated by ƒ (x_*), 
price best response is a correspondence P  : F  —* [poo,PoK p =  P ( f  (x_*)), where 
Poo — p (A , K , ...), p0 — p (0,0, ...), and maximal and minimal selections exist. Under 
condition A these selections are nonincreasing in ƒ.
2. Symmetric outputs (this is the hard part, where the aggregation is really 
used): If the first n — 1 competitors o f firm i are active and the others produce zero, 
let
ƒ  (x, n) =  ƒ  ( x , x ,  0 ,...), x € [0, K ) ,
with image 4> (n) =  [ƒ (0, n) , ƒ (K, n )j =  [ƒ, ƒ  (n )], where ƒ  =  ƒ  (0 ,...) and / ( n )  =  
ƒ (K, 0 ,...). Then ƒ is strictly increasing and continuous in x , and strictly
increasing in n. Let $  =  { ( / ,n )  6  F  x N|/ € <f>(n) } , then we can express every 
firm’s output x  by the value of the aggregator and the number of firms through a 
function x  : $  —► [0, K] such that x  is strictly increasing and continuous in ƒ, and 
strictly decreasing in n.
Consider market price at a given value of the aggregator., if all firms produce the 
same amount, even firm i (this is the basic trick):
? (ƒ .« )  =  p (x (ƒ, n ) , ƒ ),
where p : F  x  N —> [pooipo] is strictly decreasing and continuous in ƒ, and strictly 
increasing in n. For fixed n, its image is 7r(n) =  [p (ff , ƒ (n)) ,p  (0, ƒ )], where 
the upper limit is fixed, and the lower limit is nonincreasing in n. Let ft =  
{(p, n) €  [pooiPo] X N|p € 7T (n )}. Invert p with respect to ƒ, to obtain a function 
ƒ : ft —► R  which is strictly decreasing (and continuous) in p and strictly increasing 
in n. The interpretation o f ƒ  is: given price p and number o f active firms n, value of
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aggregator if all n firms produce the same amount (even firm i), resulting in price
P*
3. Symmetric equilibria: Let P  : F  —* [pooiPto] be a maximal or minimal selection 
of the price best response map P. Consider the family of maps %l'n : n (n) —* [p<„, po] 
defined by
tn ip) =  p ( / ( p ,n ) )  ,
then a maximum or minimum fixed point p(n) o f this map is maximal or minimal 
equilibrium price. Under condition A , ipn is nonincreasing in n since P  is nonincreas­
ing, so that extremal equilibrium prices are nonincreasing in n (taking into account 
that 7r (n) C 7r (n +  1)) by corollary 2.5.2 o f Topkis (1998).
Under the (non-dual) weak single-crossing property o f profits in (p,, y), P  is 
nondecreasing, and \pn is nondecreasing in n. Thus extremal equilibrium prices are 
nondecreasing in n if equilibria exist.
4. If dll/dpi exists and is strictly decreasing in Xjy then by theorem 2.8.5 o f 
Topkis (1998), which follows Amir (1996) and Edlin and Shannon (1998b ) extremal 
price best responses P  (x_j) are strictly decreasing while interior, i.e. positive. Since 
ƒ is strictly increasing in n, the map ipn (p) is strictly decreasing in n for each p} 
and therefore by corollary 2.5.2 of Topkis (1998) the extremal fixed points of tpn are 
strictly decreasing in n (Note that a subtle point o f this proof is that we can only 
say something about the extremal fixed points and not about the others). ■
Entry: Interior equilibrium  prices 
P roof. (Corollary 4)
Denote the partial derivatives of inverse demand p (rt, ƒ  (x_*)) with respect to Xi 
and f  as pi < 0  and pi < 0, o f ƒ (x.,») with respect to Xj (j  t) as fj > 0 (therefore 
p* =  pi and p? — p2fj)j and of g (x, n) with respect to x  and n as gx — (n — 1) fj  >  0 
and gn >  0, respectively. The first-order necessary condition for an interior best
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response in terms of quantity, and the second derivatives of profits, are
IT =  -£ ;n (x itx_i) =  p (x i, f ( x - i) ) + x ip i {x tJ ( x _ i) ) - c , (xi) = 0 ,
IT  = ^ r l l  (x<,x_f) =  2pi +  XiPn -  c",w i
n*J =  (x;, i_ .)  =  (p s+ XiPn) Sr
At a symmetric equilibrium with n firms,
fi* (^(n)»*1) = n  (x^„), X(nj) =  p (x(n)i9 (^(n)) n) )
+S(n)Pi (x(n),p  (x (n),n )) -  d (x (n)) -  o,
we find the following second derivatives with respect to X(nj and n, respectively:
i r  = ^_fr = ir  + (P2 + xMPl2) 9x = it + („ -  i)irj,
= £ ir  = (P2 +  x {n)p12) gn =  Utlg„/ fj .
Equilibrium quantities evolve with
dxM =  =  n ijgn/fj
dn f i «  II”  +  ( n -  1) Il*> ’
where by Seade’s stability condition the denominator fl*1 is negative. The total 
derivative of equilibrium prices is
I b T  =  ¿ P  (*W>9 (*(„), « ) ) = ( P .  + f t S x ) ^ + p 2i/n
=  — — M i — —  ( n " - - £ U r A .  
n ”  +  ( n - i ) n « V  P2/2 /
Since by condition AD the second term on the right-hand side is non-positive, the 
sign of dp(n)/dn depends entirely on whether the equilibrium is stable: Prices are 
decreasing (increasing) if the equilibrium is stable (instable), i.e. II" +  (n — 1) IItJ <  
(>)0. .
Entry: Quantities 
P roof. (Corollary 5)
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From the proof of corollary 4 we already know* that
dn IT* +  (n — l ) i r j *
If condition AD holds and equilibrium price is decreasing, then from (3.16) we can 
conclude that IT* +  (n — 1) II*-7 < 0. Therefore di(n)/dn <  ( > ) 0  if IP-7 < (>)Q , i.e. 
if goods are strategic substitutes (complements). Similarly, we can find from the 
first order condition 11' (Q („)/n , (n ~  1) Q(n)/n ) =  0 that
dQ(n) Q(n) n* -
dn n II'' +  (n — 1) ’
i.e. dQ(n)/dn > 0 if IIU — IItJ < 0. Now from condition AD and condition BS, whose 
differential form is p* < p* <  0,
o > —if -  nf-f > if -  i f
since at interior equilibria II*1 <  0 and 0 <  p>/p* < 1. ■
Entry: Profits 
P roof. (Corollary 6)
From the proof o f theorem 3 it is easy to see that under condition A /(n) =  
ƒ (p(n)> n) is strictly increasing in n, since ƒ is strictly decreasing in p(„) and strictly 
increasing in nt and p(n) is nonincreasing in n.
Since goods are substitutes, profits I I (x ,/)  are nonincreasing in ƒ. As ƒ(„) is 
increasing in n,
n  (x(„), /(n)) >  n  (r(n+l),/(n)) >  II ( X ( n+1) ,  /(n+l)) ,
where X(„j and X(n+i) are the corresponding equilibrium outputs, and the first in­
equality expresses the fact that X(n) maximizes profits. If p is strictly decreasing in 
ƒ  then the second inequality is strict. ■
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